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Abstract
The current air traffic environment in airport terminal areas experiences substantial delays
when weather conditions deteriorate to Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).
Expected future increases in air traffic will put additional pressures on the National Airspace
System (NAS) and will further compound the high costs associated with airport delays. To
address this problem, NASA has embarked on a program to address Terminal Area
Productivity (TAP). The goals of the TAP program are to provide increased efficiencies in air
traffic during the approach, landing, and surface operations in low-visibility conditions. The
ultimate goal is to achieve efficiencies of terminal area flight operations commensurate with
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) at current or improved levels of safety.
This report documents the results of a study, which addresses the problem of achieving
independent parallel runway approaches to closely-spaced runways in IMC weather. More
specifically, a flight-deck centered system approach is considered that monitors progress of
aircraft performing simultaneous, independent parallel approaches (in IMC), provides timely
and reliable cautions and alerts in the event of aircraft deviations from their intended flight
paths, and provides guidance for appropriate evasive actions to be taken by the flight crew to
avoid an incident.
This study was conducted under the NASA TAP program and documents the top-level system
concept. This initial study focused primarily on the alerting portion of the system and
provides an indication to the ultimate limits of reduction in runway spacings that may be
accommodated. A number of important issues require further investigation before this
concept can gain acceptance in the operational environment.
Table of Contents
l.
.
,
.
5.
Introduction 1- 1
1.1 Background 1-2
1.2 Current Runway Spacings for Independent Parallel Approaches 1-3
1.3 AILS System Concept 1-4
1.4 Organization of Report 1-9
AILS Alerting 2- l
2.1 Overview of the AILS Alerting Problem 2-1
2.2 Alerting System Development and Evaluation Methodologies 2-3
2.3 Current Parallel Approach Procedures - Scope of AILS Alerting System 2-5
2.4 Development and Evaluation of AILS Alerting Algorithms - Approach 2-7
2.5 Candidate AILS Alerting Algorithms 2-9
2.5.1 Circular Alerting System 2-11
2.5.2 Segmented Alerting System 2-12
2.5.3 TCAS-like Alerting System 2-17
2.5.4 MIT Alerting System 2-17
AILS Alerting Monte Carlo Simulation Approach 3-1
3.1 Alerting Simulation Assumptions 3-1
3.2 Flight Track Templates 3-2
3.3 Cross Track Distributions - Analysis of Total System Error (TSE) 3-5
3.4 Pilot Response Time Distribution 3-6
3.5 AILS Alerting - Monte Carlo Simulator 3-7
Top-Level Summary of AILS Alerting Performance 4-1
AILS Alerting Performance Sensitivities 5-1
5.1 Performance of"TCAS-like" Alerting System 5-1
5.2 Comparison of Circular, Segmented and MIT Alerting Systems 5-1
5.3 Segmented Alerting System Performance 5-5
5.3.1 Alerting Performance as a Function of Blunder Type 5-5
5.3.2 Alerting Performance as a Function of Cross-Track Distribution 5-6
5.3.3 Alerting Performance as a Function of (State Variable) Data Uncertainty 5-8
5.3.4 Alerting Performance as a Function of Data Update Rate 5-10
5.3.5 Alerting Performance as a Function of Communication Link Failure 5-10
5.3.6 Alerting Performance as a Function of Pilot/Aircraft Response Time 5-13
5.3.7 Alerting Performance versus Type of Evasive Maneuver 5-14
5.4 AILS Alerting Performance - Summary 5-18
ii
Table of Contents
.
7.
.
9.
10.
Sensor Requirements
Data Link Communication Requirements
7.1 Current Extended Squitter Definitions
7.2 Current GICB Interrogation Formats for Possible ACAS Crosslink Use
7.3 Impact of Link Failure Rate
7.4 Potential Need for Time Tagging of AILS Position Updates
Required Airspace Infrastructure for AILS
Assessment of Avionics for AILS
9.1 AILS RNP Avionics
9.2 ADS-B / Surveillance Data Link
9.3 AILS Alerting Avionics
9.4 Avionics Sensors
9.5 Displays
Existing and Evolving PRM Techniques
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
FAA Precision Runway Monitor
PRM Augmented with GPS
PRM Augmented with Multilateration
PRM Cost Considerations
11. Summary and Future Plans
Appendix A AILS Guidelines and Procedure Tables
Appendix B Total System Error Analysis
Appendix C Flight Track Templates used for AILS Alerting Simulation
6-1
7-1
7-1
7-2
7-2
7-6
8-1
9-1
9-1
9-3
9-3
9-3
9-3
10-1
10-1
10-1
10-2
10-2
11-1
A-1
B-1
C-1
111
Figure 1-1
Figure 2-1
Figure 2-2
Figure 2-3
Figure 2-4
Figure 2-5
Figure 2-6
Figure 2-7
Figure 2-8
Figure 2-9
Figure 2-10
Figure 2-11
Figure 2-12
Figure 2-13
Figure 2-14
Figure 2-15
Figure 3-1
Figure 3-2
Figure 3-3
Figure 3-4
Figure 3-5
Figure 3-6
Figure 3-7
Figure 5-1
Figure 5-2
Figure 5-3
Figure 5-4
Figure 5-5
Figure 5-6
List of Figures
Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) - System Concept 1-5
Worst Case Blunder-30 Degree Standard Rate Turn (2.4 sec PRM Updates) 2-1
Actual and Predicted Flight Tracks - 10 Second Heading Prediction 2-2
Alerting Decision Outcomes - Example Pr(I I y) With Alerting Threshold 2-4
Relationship Between Alerting Threshold Location and P(FA) and P(MD) 2-4
System Operating Characteristic (SOC) Curve 2-5
Vertical Approach Profile for Independent Parallel Runway Approaches 2-6
Preliminary Alerting Using Ground Track Heading Prediction 2-10
Preliminary Alerting Using Circular Path Prediction (Bank Angle) 2-11
Constant Bank Turn Assumption for Circular Alerting 2-12
Successive Circular Alerting Predictions for a 30 Degree Blunder 2-13
Several Potential Flight Path Predictions for Segmented Alerting 2-13
Segmented Predictions (Evader Aircraft Predicted at 26,000 ft Long. Track) 2-14
Segmented Predictions (Evader Aircraft Predicted at 25,000 ft Long. Track) 2-15
Segmented Predictions (Evader Aircraft Predicted at 22,000 ft Long. Track) 2-15
MIT Alerting Algorithm 2-18
30 Degree Heading Blunder - Cross Track 3-3
30 Degree Heading Blunder - Bank Angle/Roll and Pitch 3-3
30 Degree Heading Blunder - Ground Track Heading 3-4
30 Degree Heading Blunder - Barometric Altitude 3-4
Graphical Summary of Total System Error (TSE) 3-6
Pilot Response Time - Rayleigh Distribution (or = 5 seconds) 3-6
Parallel Approach Simulator - Top-Level Block Diagram 3-7
Incident Resolution for AILS Alerting Systems 5-2
False Alarm Rates for AILS Alerting Systems 5-3
Normal Run False Alarm Rate 5-4
Near Miss False Alarm Rate 5-4
Incident Resolution as a Function of Blunder Type 5-5
False Alarm Rate as a Function of Blunder Type 5-6
iv
Figure 5-7
Figure 5-8
Figure 5-9
Figure 5-10
Figure 5-11
Figure 5-12
Figure 5-13
Figure 5-14
Figure 5-15
Figure 5-16
Figure 5-17
Figure 5-18
Figure 5-19
Figure 5-20
Figure 5-21
Figure 7-1
Figure 7-2
Figure 9-1
List of Figures
Incident Resolution as a Function of Cross-Track Distribution
False Alarm Rate as a Function of Cross-Track Distribution
Incident Resolution as a Function of Sensor Accuracy
False Alarm Rate as a Function of Sensor Accuracy
Incident Resolution as a Function of Data Update Rate
False Alarm Rate as a Function of Data Update Rate
Incident Resolution as a Function of Link Failure Rate
False Alarm Rate as a Function of Link Failure Rate
Incident Resolution as a Function of Pilot / Aircraft Response Time
False Alarm Rate as a Function of Pilot / Aircraft Response Time
Example #1 of an Induced Incident
Example #2 of an Induced Incident (Plan View)
Example #1 of an Induced Incident
Incident Resolution for Several Types of Evasive Maneuvers
False Alarm Rate for Several Types of Evasive Maneuvers
Extended Squitter Formats
GICB Reply Formats
AILS Required Navigation Performance (RNP) "Rocket Ship"
5-7
5-7
5-9
5-9
5-11
5-11
5-12
5-12
5-13
5-14
5-15
5-16
5-16
5-17
5-17
7-3
7-4
9-2
V
List of Tables
Table 3-1
Table 4-1
Table 4-2
Table 4-3
Table 4-4
Table 4-5
Table 5-1
Table 5-2
Table 7-1
Table 7-2
Table 10-1
Table 10-2
Table A- 1
Table A-2
Summary of Total System Error (TSE)
Summary of Ideal and Non-Ideal Distributions used in AILS Alerting
Segmented Alerting - Ideal
MIT Alerting - Ideal
Segmented Alerting - Non-Ideal
MIT Alerting - Non-Ideal
"TCAS-Like" Alerting Performance for 30 ° Heading Blunder
Summary of ARINC Sensor Specifications
Extended Squitter Reception Probabilities
First Attempt Reception Probabilities of an Extended Squitter
Estimated Capital Equipment Costs
Estimated Total System Capital Costs
Guidelines for Closely-Spaced Parallel Runway Operations
AILS Flight Simulator Experiment Assumptions
3-5
4-1
4-3
4-5
4-7
4-9
5-1
5-8
7-5
7-6
10-4
10-4
A-1
A-5
vi
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Scott Chamberlain, Jim Klein, Joel Wichgers, Ross Beins,
Stan Zimmerman, Jeff Spicer, Pat Bulten, Jim Doty, and Tom Sharpe for their contributions to
this study.
Scott Chamberlain's contributions in developing the AILS simulation program and AILS
alerting algorithms were invaluable to our effort. Jim Klein provided the assessment and cost
comparison of existing and evolving runway monitoring systems other than AILS and
consulted throughout the project. Joel Wichgers' analysis of lateral error budgets associated
with various types of runway approaches (manual/autoland, ILS/GPS/augmented GPS)
provided an important input to the study. Ross Beins and Stan Zimmerman ably piloted
numerous runway approaches (both normal approaches and scripted blunder approaches) in
our Fokker 70 part-task simulator, providing real-world aircraft state data that served as flight
track templates for evaluating the AILS alerting algorithms. Jeff Spicer provided all the data
collection support for gathering the flight track template data files. Pat Bulten supported the
analysis of aircraft data and communication requirements and Jim Doty demonstrated
surveillance accuracy that can be achieved by a precision runway monitor based on
multilateration surveillance of aircraft transponder replies. Tom Sharpe served as both
program manager and technical consultant throughout the study.
Special thanks also to Jim Kuchar and Brenda Carpenter from MIT for our close working
relationship and information exchanges during the development of AILS alerting algorithms.
vii

1.0 Introduction
With the advent of global, satellite-based navigation and data link communications
technology, the aviation industry is now able to address air space solutions that provide for
more efficient travel while maintaining safety. Two such areas are the Future Air Navigation
System / Air Traffic Management (FANS/ATM) system and airport terminal area capacity
improvement initiatives. Much focus is currently being given toward the development of
FANS/ATM since immediate cost benefits are expected. To a somewhat lesser extent,
programs and flight tests directed toward improving the efficiency of airport terminal area
operations are also being addressed by the aviation community.
FANS/A TM
FANS/ATM is moving toward the concept of free flight, where aircraft can choose and
negotiate preferred flight paths under the watchful eye of the ATM ground system. This
compares to today's system where aircraft are assigned to relatively rigid flight paths and air
corridors under direct control by the air traffic control system. Free flight allows selection of
routes that take advantage of wind patterns, and allows aircraft to operate at preferred
performance levels. In FANS/ATM, the role of air traffic control (ATC) is to manage the air
traffic environment by monitoring the flight progress and future flight path intent of aircraft in
free flight. Only in the event of potential conflicts between flight paths will ATC intervene,
providing the necessary coordination of air routes between aircraft. Free flight is expected to
result in significant cost savings to the air travel industry, and will accommodate expected
increases in air traffic.
Airport Terminal Area Capacity Improvement Programs
With the expected benefits of free flight and the expected increases in air traffic, it becomes
paramount for the aviation industry to address the congestion problems at major airport
terminals. Substantial airport delays are already occurring at the nations largest airports and
are expected to increase as traffic loads increase. While construction of new airports or
expansion of existing airports will provide additional capacity, this carries a substantial price
tag. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is actively pursuing initiatives to increase
the capacity of airport terminal areas.
Improved ATC procedures, terminal automation support to controllers, additional Instrument
Landing Systems, improved controller display aids, improved utilization of multiple runways,
etc., are all expected to increase airport capacity. The FAA Airport Surface Traffic
Automation (ASTA) program is also addressing the problem of surface operations during low-
visibility conditions. Under the Terminal Air Traffic Control Automation (TATCA) program,
the FAA is developing software automation tools that assist the controllers and thus allow
increases in airport capacity. Some of the automation tools are Converging Runway Display
Aid (CRDA) and Controller Automated Spacing Aid (CASA). The Center-TRACON
Automation System (CTAS) jointly being developed by FAA and NASA Ames Research
Center provides an additional set of integrated tools that support the approach and departure
of aircraft. The Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), Descent Advisor (DA), Final Approach
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SpacingTool (FAST), andtheExpediteDeparturePath(EDP)toolsall assistthecontrollerby
computinganoptimumtraffic planandadvisingthecontrollerin schedulingarrivalsand
departures.
In additionto FAA efforts,NASA LangleyandNASA AmesResearchCentersarealso
working to improveairportcapacities.NASA's TerminalAreaProductivity(TAP)program
is intendedto supportthe industrywith thedevelopmentof appropriatetechnologies,system
solutions,andalsoto involve industryin achievingimprovedefficiencyandsafetyof terminal
areaoperations,particularlyduringlow-visibility weatherconditions.
Themajorcomponentsof TAP are1)to increasethenumberof approaches/landingsper
runwayby reducingin-trail andlateralseparationsbetweenaircraft,2) ATC automation
providingoptimizedsequencing,schedulingandcontrolof aircraft,andallowing rapid
runwayandairspacereconfiguration,3) providelow-visibility landingandsurfaceoperations
via integratedcockpit aids;navigation,guidanceandcontrols;andimagingsensorswhere
possible,and4) integrationof aircraft-ATCautomationfunctions.
Scope of Report
The scope of this study and associated report is in support of NASA's TAP program that
addresses reduced lateral separation between aircraft, i.e., to determine recommendations for
the minimum allowable spacing of parallel runways that can support independent parallel
runway approaches during Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The NASA group
addressing this problem is the Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) team. The
program is conducted by NASA Langley and NASA Ames Research Centers. Other team
members are Lockheed Engineering Services, MIT and Rockwell Collins Avionics.
While the overall AILS system concept, objectives and goals are presented in section 1.3, the
primary focus of this report is to document Collins' contribution to the A1LS study and system
concept development. Where appropriate, this report also references activities of other team
members in support of AILS.
The emphasis of Collins' AILS study has been on the development and evaluation of
prototype AILS alerting algorithms that provide reliable and timely warning against
inadvertent aircraft deviations or blunders by one aircraft into the flight path of the other
aircraft during independent parallel runway approaches. The study also addresses avionics
sensor and data communications requirements necessary to enable the AILS alerting concept,
defines airspace infrastructure requirements, and provides an assessment of NASA's Boeing
757 Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) avionics system to support flight tests of
AILS. The study concludes with a cost comparison of the flight-deck centered AILS alerting
system to other existing and evolving parallel runway monitoring systems.
1.1 Baekgrountt
The number of flight delays experienced each year continues to increase as air traffic demand
is placing a greater strain on the available capacity of the National Airspace System (NAS). In
1989 alone about 1,600,000 hours of delay time occurred, representing about 12 percent of US
carrier fleet capacity [ 1]. According to a Boeing Market Outlook, domestic air carrier flights
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areexpectedto increase50%from 1989to 2010. Without substantialNAS capacity
improvements,flight delayswill continueto increase.
A majorcontributorto flight delaysis thecapacityof airports. As indicated,anumberof
airportterminalareacapacityimprovementinitiativesarecurrentlybeingpursuedby FAA,
NASA (TAPprogram),andothers.An importantbottleneckin traffic throughputat airports
is thenumberof approachoperationsper runway. Greatesthroughputcanbeachievedfor
independentparallelrunwayapproachesto multiple runways.For closely-spacedrunways,it
maybecomenecessaryto staggeraircraftonalternaterunwaysduringapproachto assure
sufficient lateralspacing,i.e., parallelrunwayapproachesaredependent.
Maximum approachthroughputratesareachievedfor independentparallelrunway
approachesin VisualMeteorologicalConditions(VMC). Accordingto Boeingsimulation
results,independentapproachthroughputratesin IMC arereducedby 16%versusVMC, and
dependentparallelapproachthroughputis reducedup to 48%during InstrumentFlight Rule
(IFR) conditions[1]. ThussignificantdelayscanbeavoidedduringIMC andIFR conditions
if independentparallelapproachoperationscanbesustained.
1.2 Current Runway Spacings for Independent Parallel Approaches
A history of simultaneous parallel approaches [1] indicates how allowable runway spacings
have been reduced over time, from 6,200 ft spacings at J.F. Kennedy and Washington-Dulles
airports (early 1960's) to current allowable spacings. In VMC, runway spacings for
independent approaches can be as low as 700 ft. In IMC (runway visual range at or below 3
miles or ceiling at or below 1,000 ft), independent parallel approaches are allowed to runway
spacings down to 4,300 ft. The primary factors that limit runway spacing to 4,300 ft in IMC
are the surveillance update rate and accuracy of the secondary surveillance radar (SSR).
Conventional SSR's provide updates at 4.8 seconds intervals (antenna rotation period) and
main beam accuracy of 5 milliradians in azimuth.
MITRE Corporation performed a study in 1981 that examined the relationship of surveillance
update rate and accuracy to allowable runway spacing and concluded that for 1 milliradian
accuracies and 1 sec surveillance update rates the minimum achievable runway spacing for
independent parallel approach is 3,000 ft [2].
Based on MITRE's findings, the FAA has developed a Precision Runway Monitor (PRM)
system that utilizes an improved SSR [3] that allows a reduction in runway spacing from
4,300 ft to 3,400 ft for independent parallel approaches in IMC. Two types of systems were
developed; one using a 2.4 second update rate, using back-to-back antenna beams on a
conventional SSR with improved azimuthal accuracy of 1 milliradian, and an electronically-
scanned (E-scan) directional antenna with 1 milliradian accuracy. Update rate on E-scan
surveillance interrogations were set at 0.5 sec.
The PRM system provides surveillance replies to a controller display that depicts both
approach paths, a Non-Transgression Zone (NTZ) between runways, and displays current
aircraft location along with a 10 second trend vector of predicted aircraft heading. Aircraft
tracks are maintained based on surveillance replies and an alpha-beta tracking filter that uses
range and range-rate to update position reports. The controller monitors the conformance of
each aircraft to its respective approach path and issues a breakout warning to the threatened
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aircraft in the event of an aircraft transgression into the NTZ. The warning is issued via the
ATC VHF voice radio.
While prototype PRM systems have been demonstrated, there are only a limited number of
PRM systems that are in the commissioning stage. A concern has been raised about the
possibility of a temporary blockage of the communications channel in the event the controller
needs to issue a breakout warning. The FAA is continuing to explore PRM alternatives based
on surveillance concepts using Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS-B) position squitters
by aircraft, and multilateration, i.e., triangulation, of aircraft replies by multiple ground
sensors.
1.3 AILS System Concept
As indicated, this study supports NASA's Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS)
project that falls under the umbrella of TAP. The primary objective and goal of this project is
to develop a flight deck based system to monitor independent parallel runway approaches in
IMC to achieve further reductions in runway spacings beyond the 3,400 ft limit provided by
the PRM.
As illustrated in Figure 1-1, the AILS system, supporting coordinated parallel runway
approaches, consists of two main components; 1) a parallel approach Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) conformance monitoring sub-system of own aircraft's (i.e., also termed
evader aircraft) adherence to its approach path or tunnel, and 2) a surveillance and alerting
sub-system that tracks the aircraft state of the other aircraft (i.e., also termed intruder aircraft)
in the event of a deviation or blunder by the intruder into own aircraft's flight path. An AILS
avionics system thus consists of an AILS Parallel Runway RNP sub-system and an AILS
Alerting sub-system to serve as a back-up system in the event of a failure by the intruder' s
AILS RNP avionics.
Also depicted in Figure 1-1 for the purpose of baseline comparison is the PRM system
discussed earlier. The AILS system seeks to improve upon the PRM's 3,400 ft parallel
runway spacing limit by utilizing improved aircraft state surveillance and by eliminating the
need for uplink of blunder warnings from ATC.
The AILS system provides the flight crew with situational awareness during parallel
approaches in IMC via display information on the Navigation Display (ND) and Primary
Flight Display (PFD). It also provides on-board caution and warning alerts of parallel
approach RNP violations by own aircraft and blunder alerts due to flight path deviations by
the intruder aircraft.
The reference to the TSRV simulator in Figure 1-1 is included to note planned flight simulator
experiments that will evaluate the performance of AILS system concepts by monitoring a
number of dependent variables (closest encounter, pilot response time, and subjective
comments on the performance of the system) as runway spacing is varied.
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AILS Objectives and Goals
The following objectives/goals guide the development of the AILS system:
1) Achieve reduced runway spacings below those attainable by the PRM system through
a) improved surveillance of aircraft intruder state and intent, providing reliable and
timely alerts in the event a blunder occurs
b) improved communication/provision of caution and warning alerts to flight crew
c) development of a Parallel Approach RNP capability that provides high-integrity
conformance to the parallel approach path.
2) Define information requirements for
a) providing the intruder alerting function
b) flight crew situational awareness and guidance
3) Define AILS flight crew procedures that
a) reduce pilot response time in taking evasive action in the event of an intruder blunder
b) do not add excessive additional workload to the flight crew during parallel approach
operations.
4) Develop display formats that provide easily understood and discernible situational
awareness and guidance to the flight crew.
5) Utilize existing and planned airspace infrastructure and capabilities, and avionics systems
in order to minimize the cost of providing AILS parallel approach capability.
6) Provide display formats that allow transition from approach to taxi and surface operations.
AILS System Issues and Tradeoffs
A number of key issues and tradeoffs must be assessed and evaluated in the development of
the AILS system. Many of these issues pertain to the alerting system, the role of displays
(display formats) in providing the flight crew with appropriate situational awareness and
guidance, and the type of evasive maneuver that is appropriate to avoid an aircraft collision
incident. All of these are highly inter-related and require human factors and flight simulation
evaluation to determine the appropriate level of flight crew - AILS system interaction.
A number of key questions must be answered:
1) What is the proper balance of full automation and rules versus human-in-the-loop
judgment in detecting a threatening encounter and taking appropriate evasive action
2) Should simple displays be used, providing only level 3 alerts (alerts that require direct and
unambiguous evasive action by the pilot), or should displays include additional
information and formats that provide sufficient situational awareness and guidance for the
pilot, for judgmental decision making on when an evasive maneuver is appropriate, and
the extent of evasive maneuver that is needed to avoid an incident.
3) Scaling of display formats must balance the need for monitoring the entire approach path,
while at the same time providing sufficient detail of AILS information on close-in parallel
approach traffic and obstacles. Use of non-linear scaling to accommodate both aspects
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requires human factors evaluation and flight simulation to ensure that display information
matches pilot perception of the situation, is easily discernible and does not compromise
the primary approach task (i.e., does not increase pilot workload during final approach).
The success of the AILS system concept for providing parallel runway approaches to closely-
spaced runways depends entirely on the proper development of the surveillance/alerting
function and on the ability of the system to allow for relatively short pilot response times in
the event an evasive maneuver is required. Thus the above noted automation versus human-
in-the-loop, and display format related issues are crucial to successful development of AILS.
Some other important issues to be addressed by the AILS system are:
1) AILS interface to Air Traffic Control in terms of communications and procedures in the
event of an aircraft blunder during parallel approach operations.
2) The role and effect of wake vortex turbulence when runway spacings are reduced. At present,
2,500 ft lateral spacing is the lower limit for dependent parallel approaches [3]. As part of the
TAP program, NASA is also addressing the wake vortex problem and plans to integrate
solutions for lateral (AILS) and in-trail (wake vortex) reductions in aircraft separation.
3) Extent of pilot training needed to reduce response times to take evasive maneuver. There
is also a training issue in performing a "break out" from final approach when coupled to
the autopilot. "Break out" refers to taking evasive action during final approach.
4) For reduced runway spacings during parallel runway approaches, can aircraft be flown
manually or will autopilot approaches be required to maintain reasonable flight technical
error deviations? This must be addressed in the development of the AILS RNP sub-system.
5) Type of evasive maneuvers that will successfully avoid collision incidents. This is
integrally tied to the AILS Alerting sub-system and also depends on aircraft performance
characteristics.
6) In the event of a "break out" maneuver from final approach due to a blunder, the AILS
system must ensure against obstacles (buildings, towers, mountains, etc.) in the break out
path. This is likely airport dependent.
7) The impact of multiple parallel runways (more than two) on AILS must be considered.
An evasive maneuver away from an intruder may adversely affect other traffic that may be
performing a parallel approach near the "break out" path.
8) The interaction of AILS alerting with TCAS must also be addressed since both systems
provide separation assurance in the airport terminal area. Ultimately AILS alerting could
be viewed as an additional mode of TCAS that activates during approach and landing
operations.
9) AILS alerting performance in terms of probability of missed detection of an actual blunder
and the probability of false alarms is a key issue in the design of the alerting system in
order to achieve the required level of safety of parallel runway approaches to closely-
spaced runways.
10) Cost-benefits of AILS must be quantified.
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AILS Team Research Activities - Overview
As indicated, the AILS program is part of NASA's Terminal Area Productivity (TAP)
program and is led by NASA Langley and NASA Ames Research Centers. Other participant
on the NASA AILS team are Lockheed Engineering Services, MIT and Collins Avionics.
TAP program management is provided by NASA Ames with NASA Langley providing the
technical leadership for AILS.
NASA Ames and MIT are addressing the human factors portion of developing AILS display
formats. A number of displays and display formats are being considered that range from
relatively simple displays providing level 3 alerts to more complex displays depicting greater
pilot situational awareness and guidance allowing for more human-in-the-loop interaction.
Studies include parallel approach simulations using subject pilots in part-task simulators that
utilize a number of different displays. Subject pilots fly standard parallel approaches that are
subjected to potential intruder blunders. The effectiveness of the various AILS displays and
alerting criteria are evaluated by measuring the closest point of approach (CPA) that results
due to a parallel approach blunder, by measuring response time of the AILS system and pilot
in the event of a blunder, and by assessing the accuracy of the decision made by the subject
pilot. Pilots are interviewed for subjective comments on the performance of the various
display formats and system configurations.
Algorithms for the AILS alerting sub-system against intruder blunders are being developed by
both MIT and Collins. This research will determine the minimum achievable runway
spacings that can be supported by AILS. The close interaction between the role of AILS
display formats and alerting criteria requires feedback of research results between AILS team
members. Proper evaluation of the effectiveness of display formats and guidance cues is
contingent upon the availability of appropriate alerting criteria. Conversely, the development
of alerting criteria is also dependent upon pilot response time results from flight simulator
experiments using appropriate display formats.
In addition to providing support in the area of AILS alerting, Collins is also involved in
providing avionics support to the AILS team, both in terms of identifying avionics
requirements for sensors and data communications needed by AILS, and in providing
developmental avionics in support of flight test demonstrations of the AILS concept.
NASA Langley, with support from Lockheed Engineering Services, provides the overall
technical lead for the AILS project, coordinating results of research from other AILS team
members, and serving as system integrator in the development of flight simulator experiments
and flight tests using NASA's B757 TSRV. This activity includes the selection of PFD and
ND display formats for AILS, selection of AILS alerting criteria, and development of flight
crew procedures for AILS parallel runway approach experiments. Display formats, alerting
algorithms and flight crew procedures are integrated into the AILS flight simulator using
NASA's B757 TSRV simulator.
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AILS Status Summary of Current Activities and Future Plans
At this time, prototype display formats, alerting criteria and flight crew procedures have been
developed and have been integrated in NASA Langley's TSRV flight simulator. Evaluation
of the performance of this prototype AILS system using subject pilots is currently in progress.
While the initial AILS flight simulator experiment is in progress, research continues on the
refinement of alerting criteria and on human factors studies on the impact of AILS display
formats and displayed information on pilot performance. Improvements from these studies
will be incorporated into future flight simulator experiments and flight tests. Results from the
initial AILS flight simulator experiment will also provide useful feedback toward the
development of display format, alerting criteria and flight deck procedures.
While to date the primary focus has been on the development of display formats and alerting
criteria for the AILS (intruder) Alerting sub-system, the AILS team is also planning to address
the AILS Parallel Approach RNP sub-system. This task involves the definition of a modified
lateral approach path or tunnel that provides high-integrity aircraft RNP conformance to the
specified containment boundary. Navigation and integrity monitoring system concepts will be
developed to achieve this capability.
Appendix A provides additional information on the evolving AILS system concept as viewed
by NASA's AILS team. Included in Appendix A is a guidelines document that has been
adopted to direct the development of the AILS system (Table A- 1). In addition, assumptions
made in support of the current AILS flight simulator experiment are also documented (Table
A-2). These are living documents that are periodically revised from lessons learned by the
AILS team during the development of the system.
1.4 Organization of Report
In the previous section we have provided an overview of the NASA AILS system concept and
AILS team activities and roles. The remainder of this report discusses results from Collins'
study and development of AILS alerting criteria and examines avionics requirements needed
to enable the concept. Section 2 discusses the development of a prototype AILS alerting
system. An overview of alerting methodologies is provided, followed by a description of
several candidate alerting algorithms. Section 3 describes the AILS simulation approach.
Section 4 provides a top-level summary of AILS alerting performance, while section 5
examines AILS alerting sensitivities. Avionics sensor and data link communication
requirements are presented in sections 6 and 7, respectively. Section 8 provides top-level
airspace infrastructure requirements for AILS. Section 9 provides an assessment of NASA's
TSRV avionics for AILS, and section 10 examines existing and evolving PRM techniques
other than AILS and includes a cost comparison to AILS. A report summary and future plans
are found in section 11.
Several appendices are also included. Appendix A summarizes AILS system guidelines and
also provides a list of assumptions used in the initial flight simulator experiment of AILS.
Analysis of Total System Error for ILS and GPS-based approaches are provided in Appendix
B. Appendix C documents the flight track templates used in AILS alerting simulations.
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2. AILS Alerting
This section provides an overview of the AILS alerting problem and examines alerting
methodologies used in the development and evaluation of alerting systems. Candidate
alerting algorithms developed for AILS are then described.
2.1 Overview of the AILS Alerting Problem
The goal of AILS is to allow reductions in runway spacings below 3,400 ft for independent
parallel runway approaches during IMC. To achieve this goal, AILS must provide protection
against incursion of an intruder aircraft into the path of the evader. It is widely held that the
worst case blunder or aircraft deviation to be expected is a 30 degree standard rate turn by the
intruder toward the evader's approach path [3]. This blunder scenario is shown in Figure 2-1
for an arbitrary runway spacing of 1,800 ft for an aircraft traveling at -140 knots. Figure 2-1
indicates ideal surveillance updates by a PRM system using a 2.4 second update rate with the
aircraft landing from right to left. It is evident that for this scenario only about 20 seconds
transpire from blunder start to intercept of the evader's approach path.
A
¢:
E
I-
t_
.J
1500
1000
500
0
12
-500
-1000
o1500
00
i
15000
T
1
+
I
I
I i
I1800 ft Runway SpacingJ
Longitudinal Track (ft)
251 00
Figure 2-1 Worst Case Blunder - 30 Degree Standard Rate Turn (2.4 sec PRM Updates)
2-1
Thechallengeof anyAILS alertingsystemis to providetimelyandreliablecautionand
warningalerts. This entailsaccuratetrajectorypredictionsof aircraft flight tracksin orderto
determineif a threateningsituationis imminent. Onedifficulty with currentPrecision
RunwayMonitor (PRM) alertingconceptsis thatsurveillanceof aircraft tendsto include
appreciabletime lagsbeforeit is recognizedthatablunderhasoccurred.CurrentPRM
systemsutilize rangeandaltitudesurveillancerepliesandderiverangerate and altitude rate
from periodic updates. Due to measurement uncertainties, the alpha-beta tracking filters used
for tracking aircraft range, range rate, altitude and altitude rate, and providing trajectory
predictions provide considerable time lag in detecting an abrupt change in flight path. Even
for ideal surveillance updates and accuracy, range rate reacts relatively slow when detecting a
30 degree blunder and does not indicate the full extent of a blunder until a considerable
amount of time has transpired. Other trend predictions based on pure heading projection also
provide substantial time lags as illustrated in Figure 2-2. Figure 2-2 compares the actual track
to a predicted 10 second heading track.
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Figure 2-2 Actual and Predicted Flight Tracks - 10 Second Heading Prediction
In order to compensate for excessive time lags when detecting aircraft blunders, any alerting
system must expand the protection volume, or conversely, increase the prediction time to
ensure adequate alerting performance (i.e., low probability of missed detection, PMD, and low
probability of false alarms, PI:A). When time lags are excessive and alerting performance is
relatively poor for a particular runway spacing, the only choice is to further increase the
allowable runway spacing to ensure safety.
Before exploring candidate alerting algorithms for AILS it is appropriate to take a closer look
at alerting system methods.
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2.2 Alerting System Development and Evaluation Methodologies
A good description of alerting systems and methodologies for evaluating them is provided by
Kuchar and Hansman from MIT [4]. This report addresses the modeling of alerting systems
in "state space", which has the potential advantage of allowing a closed-form analytical
approach to be used to evaluate an alerting system. The individual state variables represent
parameters that define the dynamics of the hazard situation, e. g., relative position, velocities,
etc., for a collision avoidance system.
Much of the focus of developing an alerting system is in the prediction of the future trajectory
of aircraft tracks. By monitoring and projecting aircraft tracks, and being aware of the hazard
location or region, a system can be designed to provide alerts in the event "hazard space" is
encountered. To allow margins for aircraft maneuverability, hazard space is extended to
"maneuver limit space" and is further extend to an "alert space" since it is unrealistic to
expect limit maneuver performance in the event of an alert.
A system that is designed to avoid "alert space" may have an alerting curve as shown in
Figure 2-3. Figure 2-3 shows the probability of an incident (i.e., collision or near miss) given
the observed state measurement (y) along the projected flight track trajectory (T), i.e.,
PT(I I y). The probability of an incident is cumulative and is 0 at the far left and 1 at the far
right of the curve. Four different alerting outcomes are possible as depicted in Figure 2-3. To
the left of the alerting threshold are the regions P(TN) and P(FN), which represent the areas of
True - Negative and False - Negative, respectively. Negative refers to the fact that no alert
was issued, True implies that the correct decision (alert or no alert) was made and False
implies that the wrong alerting decision was made. P(TN) thus represents the probability of
correct non-detection and P(FN) represents the probability of missed detection. To the right
of the alerting thresholds, i.e., an alert is issued, P(TP) represents the probability of correct
detection of an incident and P(FP) represents the probability of a false alarm.
The goal of an AILS alerting system is to achieve a low probability of missed detection, PMD
(or P(FN)), and at the same time have a low probability of false alarms, PFA (or P(FP)). As
seen from Figure 2-3, in order to achieve these goals the probability of incident curve as a
function of the measurement state(s) must be relatively steep, otherwise it becomes impossible
to achieve both, low PMo and low PFA. A better illustration of this tradeoff is shown in Figure
2-4, which illustrates the relationship of PMD versus PFA. The upper curve represents the
probability of an incident given no alert was issued and subsequently no evasive action was
taken. The lower curve represents the probability of an incident when an alert was issued and
evasive action was taken. The difference between the two curves shows the benefit obtained
by the alerting system; PMD is set by the lower curve and P_A is determined by the upper curve.
Figure 2-5 shows the System Operating Characteristic (SOC) curve that results from the
thresholds in Figure 2-4. An ideal alerting system would exhibit an SOC curve that reaches
the upper left-hand comer, providing a 100 % probability of correct detection, P(CD), with 0
% false alarms, P(FA).
The steepness of the alerting curve is primarily affected by two factors: 1) selection of state
variables that model the dynamics of the system, and 2) measurement accuracy of state variables.
Improper selection, or lack of observable state variables will result in a poor alerting system.
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Reference [4] suggests a closed-form equation for evaluating the effectiveness of an alerting
system by allowing computation of Pincident. If one is able to determine the probability density
functions (PDFs) associated with the uncertainties in aircraft state-space representation, and
the range of possible aircraft trajectories that may be traversed by both aircraft, then the
methodology allows computation of Pincident using a closed-form numerical integration of these
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over the exclusion zone, which is the region of state-space where the aircraft protective
volumes encroach/collide with each other. The challenge is thus to determine the correct
PDFs associated with aircraft state variables and state trajectories. For the AILS problem, this
appears to be a very difficult task.
An alternative approach to closed-form analysis is the use of Monte Carlo simulation of
parallel runway approaches. This approach, given a sufficient number of random trials,
provides an indication of the performance of an alerting system. Parallel approach scenarios
must of course provide a good representation of the statistical variations associated with
surveillance errors, update rates of data, and the various response times and latencies
associated with the AILS system.
Monte Carlo simulations have been used in previous parallel runway alerting evaluation
studies [1][3]. This study also resorted to the use of Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate
candidate AILS alerting algorithms. The approach will be discussed later in this section.
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2.3 Current Parallel Approach Procedures - Scope of AILS Alerting System
To illustrate the scope of AILS alerting, this section provides a brief overview of the approach
and landing flight phases as they pertain to independent parallel runway approaches.
The transition from the enroute to the approach flight phase typically occurs at the last
waypoint in the flight plan, which is approximately 25 nmi from the airport. At this point the
aircraft enters the designated STAR (standard arrival route) to proceed toward the airport. In
the vicinity of entering the STAR, ATC typically makes contact with the aircraft and begins to
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issue heading vectors and altitude assignments to be followed. ATC vectoring instructions are
highly variable (in frequency and path) from airport to airport and likely vary for the same
airport depending on traffic load and weather. Vectoring instructions are currently issued via
voice communications, but may be sent via data link in the future.
Separation assurance during this phase of flight is provided by ATC with TCAS serving as a
back-up.
ATC continues to vector the aircraft toward the final approach path. The last vector
instruction from ATC is for the aircraft to "intercept" the final approach path at a designated
altitude. Currently in IMC conditions, the aircraft is "turned on" to the localizer path, with an
intercept angle of 30 degrees or less with a minimum of 1,000 ft altitude separation to other
aircraft on parallel approaches.
Figure 2-6 illustrates the vertical approach profile for parallel approaches during IMC. As
indicated, during intercept of the localizer, aircraft on parallel approach maintain a minimum
of 1,000 ft of altitude separation. Approaches are paired at either 3,000 ft / 4,000 ft or 2,000 ft
/ 3,000 ft altitudes above ground level. At these altitude pairs, aircraft abeam of each other
achieve co-altitude at approximately 9 nmi and 6 nmi, respectively. Clearly, by the time co-
altitude is reached, it is imperative that both aircraft are "established" on the localizer path,
i.e., lateral deviations that may have been as much as +/- 3,000 ft during localizer intercept are
now reduced to within typical lateral errors during final approach.
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Transition from TCAS to AILS separation assurance likely will take place late in the localizer
"turn-on" phase or early in the localizer "establish/stabilize" approach phase. TCAS and
AILS alerting functions may actually be active simultaneously for some duration to provide
some overlap in separation assurance. Needless to say, the "turn-on" and "establish/stabilize"
phases pose challenging separation assurance requirements. TCAS for instance has difficulty
in dealing with two-aircraft involved in turning on to the approach path due to their relative
close proximity and turning maneuvers. TeAS alerting thresholds are intentionally less
sensitive in this flight phase to avoid excessive false alarms while still providing separation
assurance. It is therefore vital that current localizer intercept and altitude separation standards
and procedures for independent parallel runway procedures continue to be utilized in the AILS
environment.
From the perspective of this study, the focus of AILS separation assurance / alerting begins
once both aircraft are established/stabilized on localizer and continues through landing, and
perhaps through the early part of a missed approach. A secondary issue not addressed in this
study is the TCAS/AILS alerting interface during runway intercept and during the later
portions of a missed approach.
Note: Current independent parallel runway approach procedures are defined in the FAA's
Airman's Information Manual [5].
2.4 Development and Evaluation of AILS Alerting Algorithms - Approach
The approach followed in developing and evaluating AILS alerting algorithms is as follows:
l) Identify aircraft state variables and possibly intent information that may be used to track
the aircraft state trajectories and to develop trend vector predictions leading to alerting
criteria.
Candidate state variables are position (range and altitude) and velocity vectors for both
aircraft which are derived from on-board sensors and ADS-B GPS position reports. Bank
angle of the intruding aircraft is expected to be an important state variable, leading to early
detection and prediction of aircraft blunders. Ground track and ground speed state
information for the intruding aircraft will be required if circular path trend vector
prediction is utilized. This is based on the relationship, R = V2/(g * tan(t_)), where R is the
radius of the coordinated turn, V is the aircraft ground speed, _ is the bank angle, and g is
the gravitational acceleration constant. This information may be received directly from the
intruding aircraft via data link or may be computed from ADS-B position reports.
2) Develop prototype alerting criteria.
Once state variables are identified, prototype alerting algorithms will be developed that
track and predict future aircraft trajectories based on aircraft state information. The
success of these algorithms will depend on their ability to match predicted flight
trajectories to the trajectories of actual blunders.
Alerting algorithms that are based strictly on relative range and range rate between aircraft
will likely provide inadequate (late) detection of a 30 degree blunder. This is due to the
fact that these state variables change only slowly in the early stages of such a blunder. By
including other aircraft state and intent information, such as intruder bank angle, it is
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3)
expected that an early blunder indication and improved trend vector prediction will be
possible.
For the prototype alerting algorithms, the prediction time factor, analogous to TAU used
in TCAS, must be commensurate with the sum of all AILS system response times and
latencies to allow sufficient warning for an evasive maneuver to take place. AILS system
response times consist of delays associated with sensors, data link, alerting computation,
display processing, and pilot / aircraft response time to AILS alerts.
Develop aircraft tracks for later use in Monte Carlo simulations.
a. Select blunder scenarios to be evaluated.
As indicated earlier, the 30 degree blunder represents the worst case blunder scenario,
previously considered for evaluation of FAA's ground-based PRM system [3]. The 30
degree blunder is a very aggressive and perhaps unrealistically severe blunder
scenario, which will place a substantial burden on any alerting algorithm. It is
considered in this study to allow comparison to the FAA ground-based PRM system.
Other blunder scenarios to be considered are less aggressive blunder turns and slow
drifts off course by the intruding aircraft toward the evader's runway. For this study
focus of blunder scenarios is confined to lateral blunders only, that occur once both
aircraft are established on localizer. Altitude blunders have a more pronounced effect
during aircraft turn-on to localizer, and are not considered in this initial development
of AILS alerting criteria. Missed approach blunders will also be deferred for later
evaluation.
Characterize Total System Error (TSE) / Flight Technical Error(FTE) experienced by
aircraft on final approach.
An assessment of typical cross-track / lateral errors for normally completed approaches
and landings is required. ILS and GPS-based approaches for both manual and
autopilot approach / landings will be considered.
Generate aircraft tracks for both aircraft (intruder and evader aircraft). These tracks
will serve as templates for developing the large pool of track pairs needed for Monte
Carlo simulation of AILS alerting.
Intruder tracks will be limited to a few template blunder scenarios, which exhibit
various degrees of "severity" or "aggressiveness" in terms of turn rate and heading
blunders.
Only a few evader aircraft track templates are needed in order to emulate normal
approach scenarios.
In addition to the above mentioned "normal" tracks for the evader aircraft, several
evasion maneuvers will be generated, which exhibit various levels of pilot
"aggressiveness" in taking evasive measures. These evasive maneuver segments will
be overlaid on the "normal" evader tracks during Monte Carlo simulations once an
AILS alert is issued. The evasive maneuver is activated once the prescribed pilot /
aircraft response time delay has expired.
b.
C.
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4)
5)
d. Determine statistical distributions to be used for Monte Carlo simulations.
Statistical distributions (PDFs) must be obtained for several parameters:
Cross-track displacement of flight track templates (developed in the previous step)
during track initiation, reflecting TSE and Flight Technical Errors (FTE).
Longitudinal track displacement of flight track templates between evader and
intruder aircraft to simulate the range of all possible geometries (intruder ahead or
behind evader using random distributions). A uniform distribution of offsets will
be assumed. The range of the distribution will be on the order of +/- 1.5 nmi.
Blunder start location.
Pilot and aircraft response times to actuate an evasive maneuver to an AILS alert.
A distribution of response times will be determined. Initially, response times
obtained by the FAA PRM program may be used (pilot and airplane generally
responded within 15 sec of an alert), until data becomes available from NASA's
live flight simulator tests of the AILS system. These response times will be used
to delay the overlay of evasive maneuver tracks on top of the normal evader track
being used.
Develop the APRM simulation program.
This activity involves the design and coding of the actual simulation program that will
perform the Monte Carlo evaluation of prototype AILS alerting algorithms.
Perform Monte Carlo simulations.
Monte Carlo simulations will be run for the various blunder scenarios using the aircraft
track templates obtained previously. The simulation will exercise the various probability
density functions for cross-track and longitudinal track offsets, blunder start, the range of
ground speeds of each aircraft, and pilot/aircraft response times. The output of the
simulation will be the probability of missed detection and probability of false alarms, and
an indication of closest point of approach (CPA). An incident is defined as a CPA of 500
ft or less. Other independent variables to be considered for analysis are runway spacing,
blunder type, number of track pairs to be simulated, alerting thresholds (forward
prediction time, tpredict, similar to Tau used in TCAS; protection volume threshold), type
of evasive maneuver, data uncertainty and data update rate.
2.5 Candidate AILS Alerting Algorithms
Several candidate AILS alerting algorithms were developed and evaluated. Some preliminary
alerting results influenced the development of these algorithm based on the relatively quick
response of trajectory predictions when using intruder bank angle.
The use of bank angle as a new state variable to be considered in AILS alerting is motivated
by the recognition that current PRM alerting systems have relatively poor response times due
to the slow response of range, range rate and heading state variables to high dynamic rate
blunders. As stated previously, the proper modeling of dynamics using aircraft state variables
is vital in the development of good alerting systems, i.e., relatively steep probability of
incident curves as a function of the measured state variables (refer to Figures 2-3, 2-4 and 2-
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5). Someotherdetractingcharacteristicsin currentPRM alertingsystemsare: 1)
differentiationnoiseassociatedwith thecomputationof rangeratefrom periodicrange
surveillancereplies,limited updaterateandaccuracyof surveillancedata,andthetime lag
associatedwith alpha-betatrackingfilters dueto noisyinputs.
Figures2-7and2-8 illustratepreliminaryalertingresultsfor atypical 30degreeworstcase
blunderusingtrajectorypredictionsbasedonheadingandbankangle(i. e.,a circularpath,
constantradiusturn), respectivelyfor anarbitrary 10secondpredictiontime. Thesefigures
depictthestandard30degreeinterceptof localizer(left sideof diagram),which includesan
appreciableovershootduringinitial acquisitionof localizer. The aircraftthenbeginsto
become"established"on thelocalizerasit continuestheapproachfrom left to right. The
approachcontinuesuntil theoccuranceof the30degreeblunder. As indicatedin these
figures,thecircularpathpredictionrequiresonly 2.3 secondsto projecttheblunderingaircraft
into the600ft Non-TransgressionZone(NTZ), while theheadingpathpredictiontakes5
seconds.Theoscillationsobservedin therespectivepredictedtrajectoriesaretheresultof
wind inducedvariationsin aircraftgroundtrackheadingandbankangle.
Note: TheNTZ alert detectioncriterionusedherewasonly to allow simpledemonstrationof
therelativelyaggressivepredictionmadepossibleby usingbankangle. AILS alerting
algorithmsto bediscussednextdonotutilize theNTZ alertingconceptbut insteadusethe
conceptof analertingbubbleabouteachaircraftthatprotectsagainstcollisionsandnear
misses,i. e.,CPAof lessthan500ft.
Thefollowing sectionspresenttheAILS alertingalgorithmsthatweredevelopedandevaluated.
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2.5.1 AILS Circular Alerting System (Algorithm)
For the circular alerting system, the aircraft is assumed to make a constant bank turn at its
current observed bank angle, (see Figure 2-9). At each sample instant, a new trajectory is
generated. Two parameters are computed to determine if an incident is likely; the predicted
time to when the intruder intercepts the invader's path, and the distance between the two
aircraft at the intercept point.
If the time to intercept is less than a threshold (time threshold) and the long track distance
between the aircraft at intercept is less than a threshold (warning threshold), the system
indicates that an incident is likely to occur and a warning is issued. The threshold settings
determine the false alarm (FA) and missed detection (MD) rates. Clearly, low FA and MD
rates are both desirable. However, both may not be possible depending on the alerting system
and the selection of threshold levels. By changing the thresholds, system trade-offs between
FA's and MD's can be made. The time threshold is somewhat constrained since it must
account for all of the latencies associated with the detection of an intrusion and the subsequent
evasion maneuver, i.e. the pilot/aircraft response time and the time required for the evading
aircraft to perform the evasive maneuver. Twenty seconds has typically been used as a first
approximation of these time latencies.
For circular alerting, only one trajectory per sample is used to determine if an incident is
likely. If the bank angle has large fluctuations, the predicted trajectory can change
significantly from instant-to-instant. In turn, a noisy predicted trajectory can greatly effect the
accuracy of the alerting decision and can result in a potentially high false alarm and/or missed
detection rate. Figure 2-10 shows several successive circular predictions for the 30 ° heading
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Figure 2-9 Constant Bank Turn Assumption for Circular Alerting
blunder. In this figure, the dark line is the actual flight path flown by the intruder and the
dashed lines are predictions computed from four successive bank angle measurements taken
along the flight path. The family of predicted paths show a time sequence of projections as the
aircraft's bank angle changes over time (four different times). Note that the predictions are
based strictly on the intruder's bank angle and are independent of the evader's position. For
each bank angle sample the predicted path either hits or misses the evader aircraft. For large
bank angle fluctuations, this method leads to spurious predictions and adversely effects false
alarm performance. The next section describes "segmented alerting" which attempts to
reduce the effect of bank angle fluctuation on alerting performance.
2.5.2 AILS Segmented Alerting System (Algorithm)
Like the circular approach, the segmented altering system assumes that the intruder performs a
coordinated turn at the measured bank angle. In addition, the segmented prediction allows the
intruder to roll out at several headings along the turn trajectory and follow a straight flight
path (Figure 2-11), hence the "segmented" name for the two segments of the predicted
trajectory. Thus, for each bank angle measurement the intruder prediction could follow one of
several assumed flight paths. The predicted trajectories shown in Figure 2-11 represent several
possible flight paths the intruder "may" follow. These trajectories are computed on a single
measurement update of the intruder bank angle and heading. The flight path that is most
likely to cause an incident in the least amount of time is used to determine if a warning is
issued. If the time to intercept of the selected path is less than a threshold and the long track
distance between the aircraft at intercept is less than a warning threshold, the system indicates
that an incident is likely and a warning should be issued. Using the segmented technique, the
alerting system is adaptive to the position of the evading aircraft.
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Severalpredictionscenariosareshownin Figures2-12to 2-14. As before,thedark line
representsthe actualflight pathflown by theintruderandthedashedlinesarepredictions
computedfrom four successivebankanglemeasurementstakenalongtheflight path. The
family of predictedpathsshowatime sequenceof worst-caseprojectionsastheintruder's
bankanglechangesover time(four differenttimes).
Assumingtheevader'srunwayis at 2,000ft crosstrack,Figure2-12showsthepredictions
whentheown aircraft is projectedto beat26,000ft long trackwhentheintrudercrossesthe
evader'srunway. Clearly, for anown aircraft at 26,000 ft long track the actual flight path of
the intruder represents a threat. The majority of predictions fall very close to the evader's
position and warn the evader aircraft in enough time for an evasive maneuver.
Figure 2-13 shows the predictions when own aircraft is projected to be at 25,000 ft long track
when the intruder crosses the evader's runway. Again, several of the predictions are directed
at the evader's predicted position. Since we do not actual know the intruder's flight path
when the predictions are made, a warning must be issued if the time required for the intruder
to reach own aircraft is less than the latencies required for an evasive maneuver. With a
majority of the predictions directed at own aircraft, there is better opportunity to detect
threatening situations more quickly. In contrast, none of the predictions of the circular
alerting system would provide an indication of a threatening condition when own aircraft is
projected at 25,000 feet long track (refer to Figure 2-10).
Segmented Predictions for 30 ° Heading Blunder (12.5 knot wind, fog)
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A final example of segmented alerting prediction projects own aircraft at 22,000 ft (Figure 2-
14). In this case predictions directed at own aircraft represent a relatively long period of time
(long distance) and, thus a warning would not be issued. Notice that two of the predictions
are not directed at the evader's predicted position. At the time these predictions where made,
the alerting system determined that the intruder was not able to reach the evader's predicted
position at its measured bank angle and heading.
As indicated in the examples above, by directing predictions to where they represent the
greatest threat to own aircraft, the segmented alerting system should be able to detect blunders
more quickly than the circular approach.
While the early detection of blunders is a desirable trait of segmented alerting, a potential
concern for this method is the possibility of higher false alarm rates. This concern arises from
the fact that predictions are focused on own aircraft solving for the worst case scenario, these
being vulnerable to move frequent warnings. Based on simulation results (section 4), the
concern about excessive false alarm rates for the segmented alerting system were unfounded.
In fact, segmented alerting provided the best false alarm performance of all alerting systems.
It appears that predictions based on segmented alerting provide a good match to actual
intruder flight paths and are quite accurate. This is reflected by the fact that most false alarms
fall within 1,000 feet of own aircraft.
AILS Segmented Alertiw, Eouations
As discussed, the segmented alerting system / algorithm projects the intruder's future
trajectory into two segments; a coordinated, constant bank angle turn segment to a specified
critical heading, i.e., "circular" projection, followed by a straight path segment at the critical
heading. Equations for the "circular" path segment are as follows:
1) R = vg2 / g tan (_b), where R is the turn radius, Vg is the aircraft ground speed, g is
the gravitational acceleration constant, and _bis the bank angle.
2) kIJdo t "- Vg / R, which represents the heading rate of the coordinated turn.
At each iteration of the alerting algorithm, an update of the intruder state is provided. Intruder
state information consists of Xio, Yio, Vg, tlJ, and _, i.e., cross-track position, longitudinal
position, ground speed, heading and bank angle. Evader position is also updated (x¢o, y_o).
Using this aircraft state information, projected trajectories are calculated for a range of critical
headings. Intruder headings that endanger the evader aircraft are determined based on
warning time and warning distance thresholds. Projection of the coordinated turn uses the
following equations to compute the projected intruder cross-track and longitudinal track
displacement:
3) ctl = R * [cos (_Pi,t) - cos (_P¢_itiem)]
lh = R * [sin (_Pcriac_,) - sin (_Pi,t)],
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wherech andltl representthecross-trackandlongitudinal-trackdisplacementof
the intruderon thecoordinatedturn segment,basedon theintruderheading,Win.
andtheprojectedcritical heading,_'c.tic_a.
Thetime for the intruderto crosstheevader'sflight pathis equalto tcrossing = tl + t2, given by
4) tl = (Wc_iti_ - _I'/int) / _I_dot,
t2 = (Xeo- Xio- Ctl) / (Vg * sin (_P_iti_a)).
The associated cross-track and longitudinal-track displacement of the intruder on the straight
path segment is provided by
5) ct2 = Vg* sin (W_riti¢_a)* t2,
lt2 = Vg * cos (Wc_itic_a)* t2.
Having computed the crossing time and the expected cross-track and longitudinal-track
displacement of the intruder, the next step is to predict the position of the evader aircraft at the
crossing time, tcrossing- This allows computation of the predicted range between the evader and
intruder aircraft. If the crossing time and predicted range between aircraft fall below warning
time and distance warning thresholds, then an AILS alert is issued.
2.5.3 AILS TCAS-Like Alerting System (Algorithm)
A third alerting approach that was evaluated is similar to the approach used by TCAS.
Essentially, the algorithm that was evaluated computes time to closest approach based on
relative range and range rate between the intruder and own aircraft. We modified the TCAS
DMOD threshold to reflect a 500 ft distance.
2.5.4 AILS MIT Alerting System (Algorithm)
The MIT alerting algorithm utilizes aircraft velocity, position, heading and bank angle to
determine collision risk zones. Intruder and evader aircraft states (velocity, heading and bank
angles) are monitored to determine when the relative position between aircraft places the
intruder within the collision risk zone. In the event the collision risk zone is entered, the cross
track distance between these aircraft is examined to determine if sufficient time is still
available to hold off taking evasive action, or if an evasive maneuver is required. Figure 2-15
illustrates the MIT alerting system concept. Also included in this figure is the depiction of the
Non Transgression Zone (NTZ) alerting threshold used by the PRM system [3].
From Figure 2-15, the evader aircraft is shown at location (0, 0). The M1T alerting thresholds
for the collision risk area are determined as a function of aircraft state information (velocity,
heading, and bank angle). If the intruder falls within the collision risk area as determined by
the alerting thresholds, and is within the lateral position offset, then an alert is issued.
Comparision of alerting regions used by the PRM and MIT indicates that the NTZ (PRM) may
provide alerts in regions that do not necessarily warrant an alert (lighter colored region).
Conversely, the MIT algorithm may actually provide a greater level of protection than the
NTZ as indicated by the dark area that is outside the NTZ.
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Figure 2-15 MIT Alerting Algorithm
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3. AILS Alerting Monte Carlo Simulation Approach
Previous PRM alerting simulations utilized Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the
performance of the associated PRM alerting system. In this study, Monte Carlo simulations
were also utilized to evaluate the AILS alerting algorithms present in the previous section.
Since our goal was to examine new aircraft state representations of the dynamic blunder
environment in order to find an improved alerting system, we took the approach to obtain
actual flight track state information from our Fokker 70 part-task simulator. A number of
manually flown flight track templates were generated to represent various normal approaches,
blunder approaches, and evasive maneuvers. Approaches were flown in foggy conditions to
emulate IMC, and moderate wind gusts in all three dimensions of the coordinate system (x, y,
z) to emulate turbulence. The manual approaches were flown without flight director
guidance, with the pilot only flying to the course deviation dots on the CDI display.
Each approach flown was repeated at three different approach speeds; 130 knots, 145 knots,
and 160 knots. This was done to allow selection of a variety of flight track pairs and aircraft
dynamics for both, the evader and intruder aircraft, to allow a range of realistic approach
geometries. A fast intruder following behind the evader, or a slow intruder leading the evader
can each result in blunder scenarios that will lead to a collision or near miss, i.e., an incident,
unless AILS alerting resolves the conflict.
The Monte Carlo simulation selects a pair of flight track templates to represent the flight track
of the intruder and the evader aircraft. These templates are distributed randomly in cross
track, longitudinal track, and location of blunder start. The cross-track probability distribution
typically used emulates the cross-track deviations obtained from Memphis PRM test data [3].
This distribution is zero mean Gaussian, with a programmable standard deviation, G. Two
cross-track distributions were used most frequently; 1) o = 327 ft at 10 nmi from runway
threshold to represent a Type I ILS approach (navigation system error) with the pilot flying to
within 1 dot deviation (flight technical error), and 2) (_ = 0, relying only on the cross track
errors represented in the flight track template.
Longitudinal track offsets simulated were uniformly distributed over +/- 3,000 ft. Blunder
start offsets were also uniformly distributed over +/- 10,000 ft.
Independent variables for the simulation were runway spacing, number of track pair iterations
to be simulated, and the alerting threshold for both time prediction, Tau, and a protection
volume threshold to provide for adequate separation assurance to 500 ft closest point of
approach (CPA). Most simulations used Tau = 20 seconds to represent the longest response
time latency expected from the AILS alerting system. Results from NASA's flight simulator
experiment using subject pilots will provide an indication of pilot response time that can be
folded back into this simulation for assessing AILS alerting simulation performance.
3.1 Alerting Simulation Assumptions
A number of assumptions were made prior to performing the Monte Carlo simulations:
1) All track scenarios / encounters will be assumed to occur at co-altitude. This assumption
was made to simplify the alerting study by keeping the problem within the lateral
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dimension. This is viewedasaworstcaseapproachsincethealtitudedimensionprovides
anaddeddegreeof freedom,thatmitigatesthepossibilityof anincident.
2) The"turn-on" to localizerduringlocalizerinterceptisexcludedfrom theflight track
templates.Thepurposeis to focusthealertingproblemfrom whenaircraftare"stable"on
localizerthroughtheendof theapproachpath. Proceduralaltitudeseparationduring
localizerinterceptshouldprovidethenecessaryseparationassurance.
3) Evasivemaneuversare"cut andpaste"to theevadertrackonceanalertis issuedandthe
appropriatepilot / aircraft response time has transpired.
4) While flight track state variable data was recorded at an approximately 33 Hz rate, the
actual data update rates used in the Monte Carlo simulation was approximately 2 Hz. This
is commensurate with planned ADS-B Extended Squitter rates by Mode-S transponders.
5) Effects of measurement errors / uncertainties in aircraft state data can be applied to the
state data in the flight track templates.
3.2 Flight Track Templates
A note on the Fokker 70 flight simulator which was used to generate the flight track templates
used in the AILS Monte Carlo simulation. The Fokker 70 is a 100 passenger aircraft,
representative of typical air transports. This part-task simulator was used to generate piloted
flight tracks since it was readily available for use. The Fokker 70 part-task simulator was not
equipped with rudder pedals and the pilots utilized the side-stick controller to adjust for gust
induced heading changes. This may have accentuated the extent of bank angle activity.
However, autopilot approaches / landings confirmed similar bank angle activity. It should
also be noted that some pilots use rudder pedals to maintain heading during wind gusts, while
others use the side-stick controller.
For each flight track template the following aircraft state variables were recorded: bank
angle/roll, pitch angle, yaw/heading, ground speed, and barometric altitude. Initial flight
tracks flown were subjected to JAR All Weather Operations (AWO) specified "limit" wind
conditions in the x, y, and z directions. "Limit" winds provide conditions at the extreme end
of required aircraft autoland capability. "Limit" winds induced extreme turbulence which
resulted in substantial bank angle activity. It was later decided to scale back to moderate
turbulence wind gusts since it is unlikely that independent parallel runway operation can be
conducted in extreme wind conditions.
In flying approaches to generate flight track templates, ILS beam errors were not included and
were assumed negligible. Two pilots were used to fly flight track templates; one a former airline
pilot, the other a less experienced general aviation pilot with moderate experience in flying the
Fokker 70 aircraft model. Pilots used the course deviation dots for guidance. The autothrottle
was enabled, and yaw damper and turn coordination were also enabled.
Flight track templates flown consisted of 1) normal approach tracks, 2) a 30 degree standard
rate turn (worst case) blunder, 3) a 15 degree turn blunder, 4) a 5 degree constant bank angle
blunder, 5) a 10 degree heading blunder, 6) a 5 degree heading blunder, 7) a fake blunder (i.e.,
a turn toward the evader, followed by a return to the desired approach path), and 8) a drift off
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course away from the evader, with a sudden adjustment to return to own flight path with some
overshoot toward the evader.
Figures 3-1 to 3-4 illustrate the flight track template state variables that were recorded for the
30 degree worst case blunder for a ground speed of 145 knots. Figure 3-1 shows the cross
track and along track performance of the piloted approach. Intercept of localizer occurs on the
left side of the plot. After becoming established on localizer for most of the approach path,
the 30 degree blunder commences (toward the right hand side of the plot). Figure 3-2 shows
both bank angle and pitch information. Note the large bank angles associated with localizer
intercept and the 30 degree blunder. Figure 3-3 and 3-4 show ground track heading and
barometric altitude, respectively. The remaining flight track templates for all types of
approaches are documented in Appendix C.
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3.3 Cross Track Distributions - Analysis of Total System Error (TSE)
The Total System Error (TSE) is defined as the total error between the desired flight path and
the actual flight path. TSE is comprised of navigation system and flight technical errors. The
Navigation System Error (NSE) is the difference between the true aircraft position and the
sensed or measured aircraft position. The Flight Technical Error (FTE) is the error associated
with controlling the aircraft flight path to null the deviation (or error signal) as determined by
the navigation system.
Assuming that the NSE and FTE errors are independent and normally distributed, the standard
deviation of the TSE is related to the NSE and FTE as:
TSE = (NSE 2 + FTE2) 0"5.
An analysis was performed to determine the extent of TSE or cross track error for ILS and
GPS-based approach navigation systems for both manual and autopilot approaches. Table 3-1
provides a summary of results. Figure 3-5 provides a graphical representation of the results in
Table 3-1. Appendix B provides additional details of the analysis.
Note: A common cross-track distribution used throughout the AILS simulation program used
= 327 ft at 10 nmi from runway threshold to represent a Type I ILS approach (navigation
system error) with the pilot flying to within 1/2 dot deviation (FTE).
Navigation System &
Type of Approach/Landing
!Type I ILS, Manual (1/2 dot)
Type I ILS, Manual (1 dot)
Type III ILS, Autopilot
Std. GPS, Manual (1/2 dot)
Cat I GPS, Manual (1/2 dot)
Cat I GPS, Autopilot
Navigation
System Error
fit)
5 10
nmi nmi
299 524
299 524
286 502
328 328
26 26
26 26
Total System
Error
(ft)
Flight Technical
Error
15 5 10 15 5 10 15
nmi nmi nmi nmi nmi nmi nmi
749 283 495 708 411 721 1031
749 565 990 1415 640 1120 1601
717 100 100 100 303 511 724
328 283 495 708 433 594 780
26 283 495 708 284 496 708
26 100 100 100 103 103 103
Table 3-1 Summary of Total System Error (TSE)
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3.4 Pilot Response Time Distribution
Figure 3-6 illustrates the time distribution used to simulate variations in pilot responses to an
AILS alert before taking evasive action. A Rayleigh distribution with a standard deviation, a,
of 5 seconds was used. For this distribution, 99% of response times are within 15 seconds.
The selected response time distribution is consistent with the PRM report [3].
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Figure 3-6 Pilot Response Time - Rayleigh Distribution (a = 5 seconds)
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3.5 AILS Alerting - Monte Carlo Simulator
A top-level block diagram of the AILS Alerting Simulator developed for this study is shown
in Figure 3-7. The following paragraphs describe the simulator operation.
To start the simulation, the program reads flight track templates that were recorded for both
the intruder and evader aircraft from external files. Eight flight track scenarios were flown
using Collins' Fokker 70 part-task simulator. Scenarios include normal approaches and also
include blunder tracks and fake blunders. These flight tracks are then flown against each
other to exercise the alerting systems. Aircraft data used by the parallel approach simulator
include the aircraft's position (latitude, longitude, and altitude), bank angle, air speed, and
heading. Independent variables input via the command line include the runway separation, the
cross track distribution, the long track distribution, the pilot/aircraft response time, and the
number of Monte-Carlo runs.
Prompt User ]
for Number of
Runs ]
Read in
Flight Templates
Display Flight
Templates
Yes
Output
Simulation
Results
Figure 3-7
Generate
Distributed
Flight Templates
Update Statistica
Data
Evaluate Alerting
Criteria
] No
Evaluate Cl°sestl "[" IPelsf_or_s_Tia_ imV_ I, oint of Approacl_<----L-_ Maneuver after
Yes
Parallel Approach Simulator - Top-Level Block Diagram
Once the template files are read, the simulator begins to simulate the parallel approaches. For
each run, the flight templates are first distributed in cross track, long track, air speed, and
blunder start position according to specified probability distributions. Probably distributions
are discussed below. Once the templates are distributed, each aircraft is flown down its
respective approach path. For each pair of flight tracks, the simulation evaluates the alerting
criteria and determines the closest point of approach (CPA) between the two aircraft. If the
conditions of the alerting criteria are met, a warning is issued to the aircraft. After a random
period of time which simulates pilot response time, the own aircraft performs an evasive
maneuver. For each pair of flight tracks, false alarms and missed detection statistics are
updated.
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Theoutputsof thesimulatoraretheprobabilityof misseddetection,correctdetection,false
alarm,warning,andcautionfor eachof thealertingsystemstested.In addition,theCPA
cumulativedistributionfunction is alsocomputedandoutput. In additionto thesesimple
outputs,wehavedevelopedanintegrateddebuggingsystemto allow amoredetailedanalysis
of alertingperformance.
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4. Top-Level Summary of AILS Alerting Performance
This section provides a summary of alerting performance for the AILS Segmented and MIT
alerting systems (algorithms). These algorithms are the best performers and represent the
work of both Collins and MIT. To allow for comparison of results, MIT provided their
alerting algorithm to allow Collins to evaluate it's performance using the Collins Monte Carlo
alerting simulator described above.
One primary difficulty in assessing performance of AILS alerting algorithms is in determining
which probability distributions should be used for cross-track and longitudinal track offsets,
and pilot response time. In addition, the type of evasive maneuver also has significant impact.
Some of these answers will not be obtained until human factors and flight simulator
experiments are performed. NASA is currently conducting its initial flight simulator
experiments on evaluating a prototype AILS system. It is expected that some of the results
obtained from these experiments will provide useful inputs to these Monte Carlo AILS
alerting simulations.
Until this feedback is obtained, we have assumed two different simulation scenarios; one
using "ideal" probability distributions and one using "non-ideal" distributions. Table 4-1
summarizes these scenarios.
Ideal Distributions Non-Ideal Distributions
Cross-track offset zero Manual ILS approach, 1/2 dot
flight technical error
Longitudinal-track offset +/-9,000 ft range +/- 3,000 ft range
Pilot response time
Avionics sensor data
uncertainties
Data update rate
Data link failure rate
Evasive maneuver
fixed at 5 seconds Rayleigh distributed, o = 5
sec, 99% within 15 seconds
None Yes
2 Hz 1 Hz
None 10%
2,000 ft/min climb at 0.25 g,
40 ° heading turn, 30 ° bank
angle, 10°/sec bank rate
2,000 ft/min climb at 0.25 g,
40 ° heading turn with
adaptive heading, 30 ° bank
angle, 5 °/sec bank rate
Table 4-1 Summary of Ideal and Non-Ideal Distributions used in AILS Alerting Evaluations
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Tables 4-2 through 4-5 summarize AILS alerting performance for the AILS Segmented and
MIT alerting algorithms for both ideal and non-ideal distributions. For each flight track
scenario, i.e., pair of intruder and evader flight track templates, 5000 distributed track pairs
were simulated. Thus, for all blunder types, 35000 runs are represented in each table. Flight
track templates for all scenarios simulated are provided in Appendix C.
Some explanation of the parameters in the tables is in order. "Normal run false alarms" refers
to the percentage of runs that had a false alarm when both aircraft fly a normal approach.
Normal run false alarms are highly undesirable since they erode the capacity improvements
gained by making parallel approaches to closely spaced runways. Our goal of zero false
alarms was easily achieved for ideal distributions (Tables 4-2 and 4-3) and nearly met for non-
ideal distributions (Tables 4-4 and 4-5). "Total false alarms" is the percentage of all runs that
had a false alarm. The fake blunder scenarios provide the greatest number of false alarms.
False alarms for these scenarios are difficult to avoid because the fakes are quite threatening
and the alerting systems have difficulty in discriminating between fake and actual blunders
(particularly at such close runway spacings). Again, our goal of less than 5% was easily
achieved for ideal distributions and nearly met with non-ideal distributions. "False alarms
with near miss" gives an indication of the accuracy of the alerting system. It is the percentage
of false alarm that actually come within 1,000 feet of own aircraft (without an evasive
maneuver). Therefore, although an incident would not have occurred, the situation may be
interpreted as threatening. Good alerting accuracy results in a large percentage of "near miss
false alarms". Due to the effect of the fake blunders, this parameter was further divided into
two categories, "total" and "blunders". Blunder scenarios are those that actually cross the
evader's runway. We meet the greater than 95% goal for each runway spacing except at 3,400
feet. The lower accuracy at larger runway spacings is reasonable since there is more potential
variation in the intruder's flight path for the longer flight distance. "Premature false alarms"
are warnings that occur before the blunder event commences. These are similar in nature to
the normal run false alarms and are considered highly undesirable. No premature false alarms
occurred for ideal distributions. Non-ideal distributions exhibited a 2.6% premature false
alarm rate for 1,700 ft runway spacings.
The "number of potential incidents" refers to the number of incidents (< 500 foot CPA) that
would occur if own aircraft does not perform an evasive maneuver. A large number of
potential incidents are desired to fully test the alerting systems. "Number of unresolved
incidents" refers to the number of incidents that occur even though own aircraft performs an
evasive maneuver. For ideal distributions, MIT alerting resolved all incidents while
segmented alerting resolved all but one incident.
"Incident resolution" is the percentage of potential incidents that are resolved successfully by
an evasive maneuver. Clearly, we want this value to be as high as possible. For the ideal
distributions, segmented alerting achieved better than 99.9% incident resolution. The final
entry in the tables is the percentage of incidents in which no warning was issued, (i.e., Missed
Detections without alarms). Anything other than zero percent for this parameter indicates
problems with alerting thresholds that must be eliminated.
While the initial sub-table summarizes alerting performance for all flight track scenarios, the
remaining sub-tables within each table provide alerting results for each individual flight track
scenario (blunder, normal, or fake blunder).
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Table 4-2 Segmented Alerting
Ideal
Long Track Range =
Number of Runs =
Warning Threshold =
Winds =
Heading Uncertainty =
Bank Uncertainty =
Vg Uncertainty =
Position Uncertainty =
.Segmented Alertinq (rev 8.1 ).
18228 ft Cross Track Std Dev =
5000 x 7 scenarios Alert Time =
600 ft Pilot/Aircraft Response Time =
12.5 knots Evasive Maneuver:
0 o
0 o
0 knots Update Rate =
0 feet Link Failure Rate =
0 ft
20 sec
Rayleigh (_ = 5 s)
30° 8 [o 30 °
w/0.25 g pull-up to 2000 ft/min climb
2 Hz
O%
Table 1. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (all blunders)
Parameters Goal 1700 ft 2000 ft 2500 ft
Normal Run FA's 0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3400 ft
0.00%
Total # FA's < 5 % 3.0% 2.9% 2.7% 1.4%
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Total > 50 % 76.8% 58.1% 56.7% 78.5%
Blunders > 95 % 98.8% 98.3% 95.0% 81.8%
Premature FA's 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 1292 1234 1097 970
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 1 1 1
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 99.9% 99.9% 99.9%
MD's without Alarm 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MD's due to Incorrect Res. Time < 2 % 13.8% 4.5% 1.2% 2.6%
Table A1. Segmented performance for 30 ° heading blunder.
Parameters Goal 1700 ft 2000 ft 2500 ft 3400 ft
Total # FA's < 5 % 2.0% 2.5% 2.1% 2.1%
> 95 % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 296 284 298 308
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
> 20 secAverage Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm
MD's due to Incorrect Res. Time
0%
<2%
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0_
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIW0!
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
Table A2. Segmented performance for 15 ° heading blunder.
Parameters Goal 1700 ft 2000 ft 2500 ft 3400 ft
Total # FA's < 5 % 2.7% 3.0% 2.6% 2.0%
> 95 % 100.0% 99.3% 94.8% 82.4%FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 280 278 267 242
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 1 1 1
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 99.6% 99.6% 99.6%
> 20 secAverage Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm 0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
6.8
#DIV/0!
6.2
#DIV/0_
0.6
#DIV/0!
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Table
MD's due to Incorrect Res. Time
4-2 Segmented Alerting (continued)
Ideal
I <2% I #DIV/O!I #D,V/O,I #D,V/O!I #DIV/0! ]
Table A3. Segmented performance for 5 ° bank angle blunder.
Harameters
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Number of Potential Incidents
Goal
<5%
>95%
O%
1700 ft
1.3%
100.0%
0.0%
2000 ft
1.4%
100.0%
0.0%
2500 ft
1.6%
100.0%
0.0%
NA 292 294 299
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident) > 20 sec 0.0 0.0
#DIV/0!MD's without Alarm 0% #DIV/0!
MD's due to Incorrect Res. Time < 2 % #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/OI
3400 ft
1.6%
100.0%
0.0%
300
0
100.0%
0.0
#DIW0_
_nlv/nl
Table A4. Segmented performance for 10 ° heading blunder.
I-'arameters
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Goal
<5%
Incident Resolution
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident
>95%
1700 ft
2.1%
95.5%
2000 ft
2.1%
2500 ft
2.1%
3400 ft
1.9%
94.5% 85.1% 60.0%
Premature FA's 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 271 261 231 120
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
>98% 100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
> 20 sec
100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
0%
<2%
100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/OV
MD's without Alarm
MD's due to Incorrect Res. Time
100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
#l'llV/nl
Table A5. Segmented performance for 5 ° heading blunder.
Harameters
'Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Goal
<5%
Incident Resolution
Avera_le Response Time (Detect to Incident)
>95%
1700 ft
3.6%
98.9%
2000 ft
2.7%
2500 ft
2.4%
3400 ft
0.0%
97.9% 97.6% #DIV/0!
Premature FA's 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% #DIV/0!
Number of Potential Incidents NA 153 117 2 0
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
MD's without Alarm
MD's due to Incorrect Res. Time
>98% 100.0%
0.0
#DIV/O!
#DIV/0!
> 20 sec
100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
0%
100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/OI<2%
#DIV/0!
0.0
#DIV/0!
_I_IV/I'II
Table A6. Segmented performance for fake blunder.
k'arameters Goal 1700 ft 2000 ft 2500 ft 3400 ft
Total # FA's < 5 % 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft) > 95 % 47.2% 0.0% 0_0% n no/^
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Table 4-3 MITAlerting-Ideal
LongTrackRange=
Numberof Runs=
WarningThreshold=
Winds=
HeadingUncertainty=
BankUncertainty=
VgUncertainty=
PositionUncertainty=
MIT Alerting (rev 13_1 ).
18228 ft Cross Track Std Dev = 0 ft
5000 x 7 scenarios Alert Time = NA
NA Pilot/Aircraft Response Time = Fixed 5 sec
12.5 knots Evasive Maneuver: 30 ° e max bank
0 ° 10deg/sec bank rate, 30 °
0 ° 2,000 ft/min climb, 0.25 g
0 knots Update Rate = 2 Hz
0 feet Link Failure Rate = 0 %
Table 1. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (all blunders)
Parameters Goal 1700 ft 2000 ff
0.00%
2500ft
0.00%
3400 ff
0.00%Normal Run FA's 0% 0.00%
Total # FA's < 5 % 4.7% 4.9% 4.4% 2.7%
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Total > 50 % 80.3% 63.9% 65.6% 83.1%
Blunders > 95 % 97.1% 93.8% 90.0% 83.1%
Premature FA's 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 1292 1234 1097 970
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
MD's without Alarm 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 2. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (b30)
Parameters Goal 2500 ft 3400 ft
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss {< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
<5%
>95%
0%
1700 ft
4.5%
96.5%
> 20 sec
0.0%
2000 ft
5.1%
89.5%
0.0%
0.0
5.6%
83.2%
0.0%
4.7%
0.0
100.0%
0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 296 284 298 308
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
0.0 0.0
#DIV/0! #DIV/0!#DIV/0!O%
Average Response Time/Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm #DIV/0!
Table 3. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (b15)
Parameters Goal
Total # FA's < 5 %
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
>95%
O%
1700 ft
5.0%
94.3%
> 20 sec
0.0%
2000 ft
5.2%
92.5%
0.0%
2500 ft
4.4%
94.9%
0.0%
3400 ft
4.1%
85.7%
0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 280 278 267 242
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
#DIV/0! #DIV/0!#DIV/0!O%
Avera£e Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm #DIV/0!
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Table 4-3 MITAlerting-ldeal (continued)
Table 4. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (s15)
Parameters
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Goal
<5%
>95%
1700 ft
3.6%
100.0%
2000 ff
3.6%
100.0%
2500 ff
4.0%
100.0%
3400 ff
3.9%
100.0%
0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 292 294 299 300
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
>98%Incident Resolution 100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0_
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident) > 20 sec
MD's without Alarm 0%
100.0% 100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
0.0
#DIV/0!
100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
Table 5. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (slo)
Parameters Goal
Total # FA's < 5 %
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Number of Potential Incidents
>95%
0%
1700 ff
4.4%
95.7%
0.0%
2000 ff
4.1%
91.2%
0.0%
250O ft
4.1%
83.2%
0.0%
3400 ff
3.1%
55.3%
0.0%
NA 271 261 231 120
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident) > 20 sec 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MD's without Alarm 0% #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Table 6. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (sh5)
Parameters
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Goal
<5%
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm
>95%
1700 ff
4.8%
100.0%
2000 ff
3.7%
99.5%
2500 ff
2.2%
96.5%
3400 ff
0.0%
#DIV/0!
0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% #DIV/0!
Number of Potential Incidents NA 153 117 2 0
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 0 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% #DIV/0!
> 20 sec 0.0 0.0 0.0
#DIV/0! #DIV/0!#DIV/0!0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
Table 7. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (fake)
Parameters Goal
Total # FA's < 5 %
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Number of Potential Incidents
Number of Unresolved Incidents
Incident Resolution
MD's without Alarm
>95%
O%
NA
NA
>98%
O%
1700 ft
4.3%
42.4%
0.0%
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
2000 ff
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
2500 ff
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
3400 ff
0.0%
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
#DIM/0!
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Table 4-4 SegmentedAlerting
- NonIdeal
LongTrackRange=
Numberof Runs=
WarningThreshold=
Winds=
HeadingUncertainty=
BankUncertainty=
VgUncertainty--
PositionUncertainty=
Segmented Alerting (rev
6000 ft
5000 x 7 scenarios
600 ft
12.5 knots
1 °
0.1 o
2 knots
30 feet
12).
Cross Track Std Dev =
Alert Time =
Pilot/Aircraft Response Time =
Evasive Maneuver:
327 ft
20 sec
Rayleigh (O" = 5 s)
30 ° e max bank
40 ° • or > intruder
2,000 ft/min climb, 0.25g
Update Rate = 1 Hz
Link Failure Rate = 10 %
Table 1. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (all blunders)
Parameters Goal
0%
1700 ft
O.2O%
2000 ft
0.04%
2500 ft
0.00%
3400 ft
0.00%Normal Run FA's
Total # FA's < 5 % 7.9% 7.8% 7.5% 4.3%
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Total > 50 % 77.7% 65.0% 58.4% 78.8%
Blunders > 95 % 94.7% 96.9% 94.4% 85.3%
Premature FA's 0% 2.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 4067 3791 3411 2887
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 172 115 88 75
Incident Resolution > 98 % 95.8% 97.0% 97.4% 97.4%
MD's without Alarm 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 2. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (b30)
Parameters Goal 1700 ft
Total # FA's < 5 % 5.8%
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
>95% 94.1%
2000 ff
5.9%
99.7%
2500 ff
5.8%
100.0%
34OO ff
5.9%
100.0%
0% 5.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 916 905 909 878
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 144 82 27 11
Incident Resolution > 98 % 84.3% 90.9% 97.0% 98.7%
> 20 sec 13.7 15.4 16.5 19.1
0.0%0% 0.0%
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm 0.0% 0.0%
Table 3. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (b15)
Parameters Goal 1700 ft 2000 ft 2500 ft 3400 ft
Total # FA's < 5 % 7.7% 7.9% 7.7% 6.6%
> 95 % 97.2% 99.5% 93.3% 86.1%FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's 0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 897 881 854 736
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 3 4 26 33
Incident Resolution > 98 % 99.7% 99.5% 97.0% 95.5%
> 20 sec 7.4 15.6Avera@e Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm 0% 0.0% 0.0%
15.0
0.0%
18.9
0.0%
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Table 4-4 SegmentedAlerting (continued)
- NonIdeal
Table4. Alertinggoalsandachievementsforselectedrunwayspacings(s15)
Parameters
Total# FA's
FA'swithNearMiss(< 1000ft)
PrematureFA's
Goal
<5%
AverageResponseTime(DetectoIncident)
MD'swithoutAlarm
>95%
17O0ft
4.7%
92.4%
200Off
4.6%
99.1%
25O0 ff
5.0%
100.0%
3400 ft
4.5%
100.0%
0% 7.6% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 912 897 904 918
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 10 19 26 19
Incident Resolution > 98 % 98.9% 97.9% 97.1% 97.9%
> 20 sec 17.5 16.6 16.0 18.5
0.0% 0.0%0.0%O% 0.0%
Table 5. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (slo)
Parameters
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Goal
<5%
Avera£e Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm
>95%
1700 ff
6.3%
93.3%
200O ff
6.2%
89.5%
2500 ff
6.6%
88.5%
3400 ff
6.4%
68.4%
0% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 850 799 712 355
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 4 4 9 12
Incident Resolution > 98 % 99.5% 99.5% 98.7% 96.6%
> 20 sec 7.5 11.2 17.6 14.5
0.0% 0.0%0.0%0% 0.0%
Table 6. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (sh5)
Parameters Goal 1700 ft
Total # FA's < 5 % 9.9%
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
>95%
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm
0%
95.6%
3.0%
2OO0 ff
8.7%
97.3%
0.0%
2500 ff
5.4%
93.4%
0.0%
3400 ff
0.0%
#DIV/0!
#DIV/0!
Number of Potential Incidents NA 480 309 32 0
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 11 6 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 97.7% 98.1% 100.0% #DIV/0!
> 20 sec 7.7 12.7 0.0 0.0
#DIV/0!0.0%0% 0.0% #DIV/0!
Table 7. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (fake)
Parameters Goal
Total # FA's < 5 %
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
>95%
1700 ff
9.6%
47.8%
2000 ff
2.1%
10.4%
2500 ft
0.0%
0.0%
3400 ft
0.0%
#DIV/0!
0.0%
0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 12 0 0 0
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 1 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 91.7% #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
MD's without Alarm 0% 0.0% #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
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Table 4-5 MIT Alerting
Non-Ideal
MIT Alerting (rev 12 ).
Long Track Range = 6000 ft Cross Track Std Dev = 327 ft
Number of Runs = 5000 x 7 scenarios Alert Time = 20 sec
Warning Threshold = 600 ft Pilot/Aircraft Response Time = Rayleigh (O' = .5 s)
Winds = 12.5 knots Evasive Maneuver: 30 ° 8 max bank
Heading Uncertainty = 1 ° 40" _ or > intruder '{'
Bank Uncertainty = 0.1 ° 2,000 ft/min, 0.25 g
Vg Uncertainty = 2 knots Update Rate = 1 Hz
Position Uncertainty = 30 feet Link Failure Rate = 10 %
Table 1. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (all blunders)
Parameters Goal 1700 ft 2000 ft 2500 ft 3400 ft
Normal Run FA's 0% 0.16% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Total # FA's < 5 % 12.6% 12.6% 11.8% 7.9%
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Total > 50 % 83.9% 75.0% 67.5% 83.3%
Blunders > 95 % 95.9% 94.4% 89.1% 83.5%
Premature FA's 0% 0.9% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 4067 3791 3411 2887
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 195 125 92 115
Incident Resolution > 98 % 95.2% 96.7% 97.3% 96.0%
MD's without Alarm 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 2. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (b30)
Parameters
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Goal
<5%
>95%
0%
1700 fl
13.1%
94.4%
1.2%
2000
14.0%
91.4%
0.3%
2500 ff
14.1%
83.0%
0.0%
3400 ff
13.0%
96.7%
0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 916 905 909 878
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 163 95 52 46
Incident Resolution > 98 % 82.2% 89.5% 94.3% 94.8%
> 20 sec
0%
Average Response Time {Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm
16.5
0.0%
13.8 15.4
0.0%0.0%
17.6
0.0%
Table 3. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (b15)
Parameters
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Goal
<5%
>95%
0%
1700 ft
14.0%
> 20 sec
96.5%
0.7%
2000
14.4%
96.4%
18.0
0.1%
2500 ff
12.7%
92.6%
0.0%
11.8
3400 ff
12.5%
85.3%
0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 897 881 854 736
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 6 2 9 10
Incident Resolution > 98 % 99.3% 99.8% 98.9% 98.6%
22.4 22.7
0.0%0% 0.0%
Average Response Time {Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm 0.0% 0.0%
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Table 4-5 MIT Alerting (continued)
Non-Ideal
Table 4. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (s15)
Parameters Goal
Total # FA's < 5 %
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Number of Potential Incidents
>95%
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm 0%
1700 ft
11.5%
98.8%
2000 ft
11.6%
100.0%
25OO ft
11.3%
100.0%
0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0%
NA 912 897 904 918
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 13 15 30 57
Incident Resolution > 98 % 98.6% 98.3% 96.7% 93.8%
> 20 sec 16.8 16.4 16.7 16.7
0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
3400 ft
10.7%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Table 5. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (slo)
Parameters Goal
Total # FA's < 5 %
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
>95%
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm
1700 ft
13.1%
93.5%
2500 ft
12.2%
83.4%
340O ff
9.7%
2000 ft
13.1%
88.9%
0.1%
799
0
100.0%
0.0
#DIV/0!
59.9%
0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 850 712 355
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 1 1 2
Incident Resolution > 98 % 99.9% 99.9% 99.4%
> 20 sec 0.0 12.5 3.7
0.0%O% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 6. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (sh5)
Parameters
Total # FA's
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
Goal
<5%
>95%
1700 ft
14.2%
97.1%
2000 ft
11.5%
97.3%
2500 ff
5.3%
92.3%
3400 fl
0.0%
#DIV/0!
0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% #DIV/0!
Number of Potential Incidents NA 480 309 32 0
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 12 13 0 0
> 98 % 97.5% 95.8% 100.0% #DIV/0!
> 20 sec 9.7 11.7 0.0 0.0
0% 0.0% 0.0% #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Incident Resolution
Average Response Time (Detect to Incident)
MD's without Alarm
Table 7. Alerting goals and achievements for selected runway spacings (fake)
Parameters Goal 1700 ft
Total # FA's < 5 % 8.6%
FA's with Near Miss (< 1000 ft)
Premature FA's
>95%
0%
42.8%
0.4%
12
2000
1.7%
8.5%
0.0%
25O0 ff
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
3400 fl
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Number of Potential Incidents NA 0 0 0
Number of Unresolved Incidents NA 1 0 0 0
Incident Resolution > 98 % 91.7% #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
MD's without Alarm 0% 0.0% #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
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From the results displayed in Tables 4-2 and 4-3, the segmented and MIT alerting system
perform exceptionally well under ideal conditions down to 1,700 ft runway spacings for all
blunder types.
For non-ideal distributions alerting performance results are less optimistic. Due to the
reduced longitudinal offsets, a higher concentration of potential incidents occur. Again, each
flight track scenario was run 5,000 times with these distributions for a total of 35,000 runs.
From Tables 4-4 and 4-5 it is evident that alerting performance has decreased appreciably.
The number of "normal run" and "premature" false alarms at the 1,700 and 2,000 foot runway
spacings is non-zero. The increase is a direct result of the reduced aircraft separation due to
cross-track offset. Likewise, the number of total false alarms has also increased to -8% for
the segmented algorithm and -12% for the MIT algorithm for all runs. As before, the number
of false alarms are adversely affected by the fake blunders contributions. The percentage of
near miss false alarms is still high indicating good prediction accuracy.
Incident resolution is the critical parameter here. Note that the number of potential incidents
is significantly increased due to the reduced long track stagger between aircraft, so the alerting
system is being tested to a greater extent. The percentage of incidents resolved is decreased to
less than 95%. The decrease is due to the long response times that may be required for own
aircraft to start an evasive maneuver. With at most 20 seconds prediction time prior to when
an incident is likely to occur, response times on the order of 15 seconds may not give own
aircraft enough time to evade the intruder. Advanced caution alerts may be one way to reduce
the response time further. More investigation is needed in this area.
Incident resolution at runway spacings less than 2,500 feet are unacceptable, especially for the
30 ° heading blunder. At these spacings, the evader aircraft simply does not have enough
advance warning to evade the intruder aircraft successfully. Again, this result is driven by the
response time of own aircraft.
The next section takes a more detailed look at AILS alerting performance results provided by
the simulation.
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5. AILS Alerting Performance Sensitivities
This section takes a closer look at AILS alerting performance and examines sensitivities of
candidate alerting algorithms to various input parameters and probability distributions.
5.1 Performance of "TCAS-like" Alerting Algorithm
As indicated previously, "TCAS-like" alerting simulated for AILS is similar to the approach
used by TCAS. The time to closest approach, Tau, is computed to a range threshold, DMOD.
For AILS DMOD is set to 500 ft. Tau is computed based on the current range and relative
range rate between the intruder and evader aircraft, and DMOD. Tau is then compared to a
time threshold that is based on the prediction time. As seen in Table 5-1, this algorithm has
significant false alarm problems and is not useful for AILS alerting. The high-rate of false
alarms is the result of close spacings between aircraft and the variability of the range rate
computation in moderately turbulent conditions. At these close proximities, any appreciable
closing range rate is likely to trigger an alert. For Table 5-1 tpredict = 20 sec was used for the
time threshold.
Note: Parameters used for the simulation results are provided with Figures and Tables. The
following conventions are followed: CT and LT refer to cross track and longitudinal track
distributions, respectively; P/A refers to pilot / aircraft response time; state data update rate is
denoted, typically as -2 Hz; references to data uncertainty and data link failure rate indicate
whether uncertainties due to sensor errors and data link communication failures are simulated.
Refer to Table 4-1 for a list of the various ideal and non-ideal distributions used in
simulations.
False Alarm
Rate
1700 ft
38.0%
2OOOft
40.7%
2500 ft
43.1%
3400 fl
43.5%
Table 5-1 "TCAS-Like" Alerting Performance for 30 ° Heading Blunder
(CT: c=327 ft; LT: +/-3,000 ft; P/A: c=5 sec Rayleigh;
-2 Hz; no data uncertainty; no link failures)
5.2 Comparison of Circular, Segmented, and MIT Alerting Systems
Alerting performance consists of two primary criteria; 1) incident resolution rate, and 2) false
alarm rate. Figures 5-1 and 5-2 compare the alerting performance of Circular, Segmented, and
MIT alerting systems obtained from Monte Carlo simulation using the flight track data of
Appendix C.
From Figure 5-1 it is evident that there is no def'mitive trend among alerting criteria in terms
of "incident resolution" versus runway spacing. Incident resolution tends to increase between
the 1,700 and 2,000 ft runway spacings and then decreases for the 2,500 and 3,400 foot
spacings. Improvement in incident resolution from 1,700 to 2,000 ft runway spacings is a
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Figure 5-1 Incident Resolution for AILS Alerting Systems
(CT: _=327 ft; LT: +/-3,000 ft; P/A: _=5 sec Rayleigh; -2 Hz; no data uncertainty;
no link failures; evasive maneuver=-30 ° bank to 40 ° heading+ with no climb)
direct result of increased detection time for the intruder to reach the evader runway. Due to
the fixed prediction time (tpredict = 20 sec), spacings above 2,000 ft do not benefit from the
increased intercept time.
At the larger runway spacings, the intruder is flying a straight path toward the evader when it
crosses the time prediction threshold. Apparently, the time prediction is more conservative
when the intruder is turning as compared to flying a direct path toward the evader, and
consequently, the time to intercept for the straight path is underestimated, thus reducing the
incident resolution for the larger runway spacings.
Note: The evasive maneuver is a turn away form the intruder using a 40 ° heading. In the
event the intruder blunder exceeds 40 ° heading, the evasive maneuver is increased to exceed
intruder heading by 5 °. This is denoted by the "+", indicating an evasive maneuver with
adaptive turning capability. For Figure 5-I no climbing component was included in the
evasive maneuver.
Figure 5-2 compares the false alarm performance of the AILS alerting system candidates.
Segmented alerting has significantly lower false alarm rates at all four runway spacings. This
is because segmented alerting, as implemented, places constraints on worst case blunder
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Figure 5-2 False Alarm Rates for AILS Alerting Systems
(CT: o=327 ft; LT: +/-3,000 ft; P/A: c_=5 sec Rayleigh; -2 Hz; no data uncertainty;
no link failures; evasive maneuver=-30 ° bank to 40 ° heading+ with no climb)
headings to - 30 °. MIT and Circular alerting do not place such constraints on blunder
headings and thus are more vulnerable to false alarms.
An important case of false alarm performance is "normal approach" false alarms; results are
shown in Figure 5-3. Recall that "normal approach" false alarms refers to false alarms that
occur when both the evader and intruder aircraft are performing normal approaches. This of
course is highly undesirable. The MIT algorithm had the fewest number of "normal
approach" false alarms, closely followed by Segmented alerting. Circular alerting exhibits a
relatively higher rate of "normal approach" false alarms, approaching 0.8% of approaches
flown at 1,700 ft runway spacings. At 2,500 ft runway spacings or greater none of the alerting
systems experienced any "normal approach" false alarms.
Another important aspect of false alarm performance is "near miss" false alarms, i.e., false
alarms that occur for close miss distances that are not considered an incident (CPA < 1,000
ft). A high percentage of "near miss" false alarms indicates good alerting accuracy. Figure 5-
4 shows "near miss" false alarm performance. Both, MIT and Segmented alerting exhibit a
high percentage of "near miss" false alarms, with Segmented alerting having a slight edge at
the 2,500 foot runway spacing. Circular alerting has a very low percentage of "near miss"
false alarms indicating relatively poor alerting performance.
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Figure 5-3 Normal Run False Alarm Rate
(CT: G=327 ft; LT: +/-3,000 ft; P/A: _=5 sec Rayleigh; -2 Hz; no data uncertainty;
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5.3 Segmented Alerting System Performance
The remainder of section 5 discusses alerting system performance for the Segmented alerting
system.
5.3.1 Segmented Alerting Performance as a Function of Blunder Type
Figures 5-5 and 5-6 indicate the incident resolution and false alarm performance of
Segmented alerting as a function of blunder type. Four blunder scenarios are considered; 1) a
30 ° heading blunder (worst case blunder), 2) a 15 ° heading blunder, 3) a slow 5 ° heading
blunder, and 4) a constant 5 ° bank angle blunder.
From Figure 5-5 alerting performance is poor for the 30 ° heading blunder for runway spacings
below 2,500 ft. At runway spacings less than 2,500 feet the alerting algorithm does not allow
enough time to evade a 30 ° heading blunder. Performance improves significantly at runway
spacings of 2,500 feet or greater, since the evader has sufficient time to react.
At close runway spacings, increasing the prediction time is not expected to improve
performance since pilot/aircraft response time typically exceeds time to incident.
Alerting performance for the remaining blunders is considerably better. Performance for both
the 15 ° heading and the 5 ° bank angle blunder slowly degrade with increasing runway
spacing. As mentioned earlier, performance degrades when the intruder flies a straight path
toward the evader, as is the case for larger runway spacings.
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Figure 5-5 Incident Resolution as a Function of Blunder Type
(CT: G=327 ft; LT: +/-3,000 ft; P/A: _=5 sec Rayleigh; -2 Hz; no data uncertainty;
no link failures; evasive maneuver=30 ° bank to 40 ° heading+ with no climb)
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Performancefor the5° heading blunder improved with increased runway spacing. This
maybe misleading due to a limited number of potential incidents that occurred for this slow
blunder, i.e., a small sample space exists.
Figure 5-6 indicates false alarm performance for Segmented alerting as a function of blunder
type. From Figure 5-6, false alarm rate is higher for the less aggressive blunders. For
intruders with small angles of incidence, slight changes in the flight path can cause relatively
large changes in the predicted along track intercept; these large changes tend to result in a
larger number of false alarms.
With the exception of the 5 ° heading blunder, the false alarm rates were reasonably flat with
respect to runway spacing. The 5 ° heading blunder false alarm rate decreased for greater
runway spacing because the number of potential incidents drop, i.e. the track duration was not
long enough to reach the other runway for a large percentage of the time.
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Figure 5-6 False Alarm Rate as a Function of Blunder Type
(CT: _=327 ft; LT: +/-3,000 ft; P/A: c_=5 sec Rayleigh; -2 Hz; no data uncertainty;
no link failures; evasive maneuver=30 ° bank to 40 ° heading+ with no climb)
5.3.2 Alerting Performance as a Function of Cross-Track Distribution
Cross-track distributions were tested that simulate manual ILS, manual DGPS, and autopilot
DGPS approaches (i.e., Total System Errors, TSEs). Figures 5-7 and 5-8 show incident
resolution and false alarm performance for Segmented alerting as a function of the approach /
landing type (cross-track distribution).
For TSEs as large as a manual, ILS (1/2 dot FTE) approach, the cross-track distribution of the
two approach aircraft did not significantly affect the performance of the Segmented alerting
algorithm. Incident resolution increased slightly with decreasing cross-track offsets. False
alarm rates remain flat independent of cross-track distribution.
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5.3.3 Alerting Performance as a Function of (State Variable) Data Uncertainty
State variable "uncertainty" based on available and/or expected future avionics sensors were
simulated and compared to the ideal system (no uncertainty). AHRS, IRS, and GPS sensor
performance for providing the appropriate AILS state variables was considered. Table 5-2
summarizes AR/NC specifications for these sensors. Figures 5-9 and 5-10 show incident
resolution and false alarm performance of Segmented alerting for the various sensors,
respectively.
From Figure 5-9 it is evident that with AHRS absolute accuracies (ARINC 705), the incident
resolution is significantly reduced as compared to the ideal system. Track angle accuracy (+/-
6 °) is the dominant factor in reducing performance. With GPS absolute accuracies (ARINC
743), the incident resolution is only slightly degraded as compared to the ideal system.
As indicated in Figure 5-10, false alarm rates are not significantly affected by data uncertainty.
Given the current ARINC specifications and the results of this simulation, GPS accuracy will
be required to perform parallel approaches at closely spaced parallel runways.
Parameter ARINC System # bits Range Resol. Accuracy Noise Update Filter
Label [1],[2],[3] (1_) Rate BW
[4] (Hz) (Hz)
Roll 325 AHRS 15 +/- 180 ° 0.0055 ° 0.1 ° 0.03 ° 50 8
IRS
Track 317 AHRS 15 +/-180 ° 0.0055 ° +/- 6 ° 0.04 ° 20 2
Angle- IRS
mag
Ground 312 AHRS 15 4096 0.125 +/- 12 0 20 2
Speed IRS knots knots knots knots
Position- 110/120 DGPS 0.031 10 m
lat feet
Position- 1111121 DGPS 0.031 10 m
long feet
Track 313 IRS 15 +/- 180 ° 0.0055 ° +/- 5°
Angle-true
Heading- 314 IRS 15 +/- 180 ° 0.0055 ° +/- 4 °
true
Heading-
mag
Track
Angle-true
Ground
Speed
320 AHRS 15 +/- 180 ° 0.0055 ° +/- 2 °
IRS
103 GPS 15 +/-180 ° 0.0055 ° +/- 1°
112 GPS 15 4096 0.125 +/- 2
knots knots knots
1.5 m 1 NF
1.5 m 1 NF
0.02 ° 20 2
0.02 ° 20 2
0.04 ° 20 2
1 NF
I NF
[ 1] AHRS / IRS accuracies listed in ARINC 704A specification.
[2] GPS accuracies derived by in-house experts.
[3] GPS track angle accuracy derived by dividing GPS ground speed accuracy by the ground
speed, ta_acc = v_acc / v
[4] Measured using actual sensor data
Table 5-2 Summary of ARINC Sensor Specifications
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5.3.4 Alerting Performance as a Function of Data Update Rate
This section considers alerting performance as a function of state variable data update rate.
While the bulk of simulations were run at -2 Hz update rates, reductions in data update rate
were considered since it is desirable to mitigate their impact on avionics sensors and data
links. Rate reductions to 1 Hz and 0.5 Hz were considered. Figures 5-11 and 5-12 show
incident resolution and false alarm rates for Segmented alerting as a function of update rate,
respectively.
As expected, incident resolution decreases for lower update rates since blunder detection is
delayed. Degradation from 2 Hz to 1 Hz updates is minor. However, degradation from 2 Hz
to 0.5 Hz updates becomes significant. 1 Hz update rates appear sufficient for AILS
Segmented alerting. From Figure 5-12 false alarm rates are not significantly affected by
update rate.
5.3.5 Alerting Performance as a Function of Communication Link Failure
Figures 5-13 and 5-14 show incidence resolution and false alarm rate performance of
Segmented alerting as a function of communication link failure rate, respectively. The
significance of link failures is that AILS state variable data are not updated at the typical
update rate. Data link communication failure rates of 0%, 10%, and 20% were simulated.
During a link failure, the alerting system interpolates the state variables from the previous
sample. From Figures 5-13 and 5-14 it is evident that for the link failure rates that were
simulated, incident resolution did not degrade significantly. Incident resolution actually
increased slightly in some cases in the presence of link failures. This result is counter-
intuitive. However, interpolation is a smoothing process which could result in quicker
blunder detection for cases where state variables are noisy.
Link failure rates up to 10% do not appear to be a factor in alerting performance. Probability
for three consecutive communications being lost are 0.1% and 1% for 10% and 20% link
failure rates, respectfully.
False alarm rates are not significantly affected by link failures.
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Figure 5-11 Incident Resolution as a Function of Data Update Rate
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5.3.6 Alerting Performance as a Function of Pilot  Aircraft Response Time
Both fixed and distributed pilot / aircraft response times were simulated. For fixed response
time simulations, the pilot / aircraft always responded in exactly X seconds; 5 and 10 second
times were simulated. For distributed response simulations, the response time was determined
by a Rayleigh probability distribution (or=5 sec, 99% of response times are less than 15 see).
Figures 5-15 and 5-16 show incident resolution and false alarm performance for Segmented
alerting as a function of pilot / aircraft response time, respectively. From Figure 5-15 it is
evident that pilot / aircraft response time significantly impacts performance of the alerting
system. 10 second fixed response times yield relatively poor performance. 5 second fixed
response times yield exceptional performance. Rayleigh distributed response times yield
average performance, where response times greater than 5 seconds limit performance. As
seen in Figure 5-15, response time is critical at lowest runway spacings.
If we could guarantee less than 5 second pilot / aircraft response times, we could easily meet
our alerting performance goals at 2,000 ft runway spacings and very nearly meet our goals at
1,700 ft. NASA flight simulator experiments using subject pilots should provide important
feedback in this area.
Segmented Incident Resolution for Pilot/Aircraft Response
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Figure 5-15 Incident Resolution as a Function of Pilot / Aircraft Response Time
(CT: G=327 ft; LT: +/-3,000 ft; P/A: X response time; -1 Hz; GPS data uncertainty;
10% link failures; evasive maneuver=-30 ° bank to 40 ° heading+ with no climb)
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Figure 5-16 False Alarm Rate as a Function of Pilot / Aircraft Response Time
(CT: G=327 ft; LT: +/-3,000 fi; P/A: X response time; -1 Hz; GPS data uncertainty;
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5.3. 7 Alerting Performance versus Type of Evasive Maneuver
Three basic evasive maneuvers were simulated: 1) a 30 ° bank to a 40 ° heading, 2) a 30 ° bank
to 40 ° heading or 5 ° greater than intruder blunder heading (whichever is greater), and 3) a 30 °
bank to 40 ° heading or 5 ° greater than intruder with a 2,000 ft/min, 0.25 g climb.
The type of evasive maneuver significantly impacts alerting performance. The scripted
maneuver using a 30 ° bank to a 40 ° heading is least effective. Performance with this
maneuver decreases with runway spacing due to induced incidents nearly 1 minute after the
start of the evasive maneuver. As illustrated in Figure 5-17, the evader evasive maneuver is
inadequate to avoid the intruder, who eventually can catch up to the evader. (Note: Figure 5-
17 does not utilize a climb component in the evasive maneuver and the entire scenario could
be occuring at co-altitude).
In order to overcome this type of scenario, the evasive maneuver was amended to include an
adaptive turn/heading component. A 30 ° bank with an adaptive heading performed better
than the scripted maneuver, eliminating induced incidents.
The 30 ° bank to an adaptive heading with an altitude climb performs much better than either
of the previous two evasive maneuvers. Use of an altitude evasive maneuver may
significantly improve the performance of the alerting systems, but will require altitude
tracking. Use of the altitude dimension was not addressed in this AILS study and will require
further study.
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Figure 5-17 Example #1 of an Induced Incident
(evasive maneuver=30 ° bank to 40 ° heading with no climb)
Another interesting example of an induced incident is illustrated in Figures 5-18 and 5-19.
Figure 5-18 shows a lateral plan view perspective of how a late alert can result in an induced
incident even with an evasive maneuver. The 15° heading blunder appears to miss just
outside the 500 ft protection volume until late in the scenario, when an alert is finally issued.
From the altitude perspective seen in Figure 5-19, the intruder actually levels off above the
evader and would not cause an incident. However, since an alert was issued, the evader takes
evasive action and actually climbs back into the intruders path, inducing an incident.
Fortunately, the number of induced scenarios of this type are few even for a large number of
Monte Carlo simultions. This example requires further study.
Figures 5-20 and 5-21 illustrate incident resolution and false alarm performance for
Segmented alerting for several types of evasive maneuvers, respectively. From Figure 5-20,
the type of evasive maneuver has considerable influence on incident resolution. The evasive
maneuver, utilizing a 2,000 ft/min (33.3 ft/sec) climb rate provides the best performance.
False alarm performance was not affected by the evasive maneuvers that were considered.
Note: As indicated previously, this AILS alerting study was primarily focused on performing the
alerting function without regard to altitude, i.e., both aircraft in the same glideslope plane. This
assumption greatly simplified the study and also provides a worst case test if both evader and
intruder aircraft are assumed co-altitude at all times. As the study neared its conclusion, we briefly
examined the possibilities of using an evasive maneuver that includes a climb component. The use
of a climb maneuver may provide significant improvements in alerting performance for some
blunders. However, scrutiny of the altitude behavior of the intruder aircraft during the blunder is
required. In some scenarios, an evasive maneuver with a climb component will not be able to take
full advantage of the climb. Further study is required to assess climb evasive maneuvers.
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5.4 AILS Alerting Performance - Summary
AILS alerting performance is strongly dependent on the assumed "distributions" used in the
simulations, with pilot / aircraft response time being a primary factor affecting achievable
runway spacings.
The following summarizes AILS alerting performance for non-ideal distributions and using a
turn and climb evasive maneuver:
Incident Resolution:
False Alarms:
"Normal Approach" false alarms:
"Near Miss" False Alarms:
~ 95% of all blunders
-7% Segmented alerting, - 13% MIT alerting
0.1 - 0.2% for 1700 ft runway spacings,
0 for 2500 ft runway spacings
90-95% of all false alarms, indicating good alerting
accuracy.
2500 ft appears to be the minimum allowable runway spacing due to the severity of the 30 o
heading blunder (assumes Rayleigh pilot / aircraft response times with _ = 5 sec).
Cross-track errors, i.e., TSEs, do not greatly affect alerting performance.
GPS sensor accuracies will be required for AILS alerting particularly for providing ground
track heading.
1 Hz data update rates and 10% to 20% link failure rates are sufficient for AILS alerting.
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6. Sensor Requirements
Core AILS state variable data to be monitored for the evader and intruder aircraft are aircraft
position (latitude, longitude and altitude), bank angle / roll, true track / ground heading, and
ground speed. Typical aircraft sensor that provide this information are the Inertial Reference
System (IRS), the Attitude Heading Reference System (AHRS), and GPS. Table 5-2 (page 5-
8) summarizes the achievable accuracies and resolution of AILS state variable data as
provided by ARINC specifications.
Based on Monte Carlo simulation of sensor uncertainties (section 5.3.3) it was determined
that true track / ground heading accuracies provided by AHRS and IRS are inadequate due to
the +/- 60 accuracy provided by these sensors. GPS provides +/- 1° true track / ground heading
accuracy which is sufficient for the AILS Segmented alerting algorithm.
AHRS and IRS bank angle / roll data is provided to 0.1 ° accuracy at 50 Hz update rates which
is more than sufficient for AILS alerting.
GPS position accuracy of 10 meters and ground speed accuracy to within +/- 2 knots are also
sufficient for AILS alerting. GPS using either a Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) or
a Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) will achieve the needed accuracies. 1 Hz GPS
data updates are also adequate.
Since it is expected that AILS will have some reliance on broadcast Automatic Dependent
Surveillance (ADS-B) using Extended Squitters to transmit GPS position reports via the
Mode-S transponder, it is reasonable to assume that GPS will already be available for use by
AILS.
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7. Data Link Communication Requirements
To enable the AILS concept, a communication link is needed between intruder and evader
aircraft to allow exchange and monitoring of core aircraft state data for the AILS alerting
function. In addition, other procedural communications with ATC and between aircraft is
needed.
Two options are available for AILS surveillance communications; 1) obtain needed aircraft
state information of intruder aircraft via interrogations with subsequent replies, or 2) aircraft
state information may be "squittered" by each aircraft to allow monitoring by other aircraft.
Since it is expected that the future National Airspace System (NAS) will utilize ADS-B
surveillance in terminal and enroute areas for Air Traffic Management (ATM), and the likely
ADS-B communications link for transmitting GPS position reports is Mode-S, this study has
focused on the use of Mode-S as the AILS surveillance link.
Mode-S Specific Services have been defined by the SSR Improvements and Collision
Avoidance Systems Panel (SICASP) Working Group 1 [8], that allow ATC ground stations to
derive a substantial amount of aircraft state information via Mode-S Ground Initiated Comm-
B (GICB) interrogations. The airborne Mode-S transponder maintains 255 GICB registers
whose contents can be selectively requested via interrogations from ATC. A similar
capability is being sought and defined by the SICASP Working Group 1 for an Airborne
Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) Crosslink [9]. ACAS Crosslink allows an aircraft to
obtain additional information from another aircraft via air-air interrogations and replies. This
is one of the methods AILS could utilize to derive intruder aircraft state information.
Another mechanism currently being defined for air-to-air data exchanges over Mode-S is
ADS-B Extended Squitter. Change NO. 2A of RTCA DO-181A [10] has defined a number of
Extended Squitter formats that allow exchange of pertinent aircraft state data via squitters for
airport surface, terminal area and enroute surveillance for ATM.
Thus conceptually, mechanisms are in place that can support either interrogation-based or
squitter-based AILS data exchanges of AILS aircraft state information. However, not all state
variables needed by AILS have been defined.
7.1 Current Extended Squirter Definitions
RTCA DO-181 A, Change NO. 2A has defined the following Extended Squitter types:
1. Airborne position (GICB register 05H, transmitted 2 / sec with + 0.1 sec jitter)
2. Surface position (GICB register 06H, transmitted 2 / sec with + 0.1 sec jitter)
3. Aircraft ID (GICB register 08H, transmitted once per 5 sec with + 0.2 sec jitter)
4. Airborne supplementary (GICB register 09H, transmitted 2 / sec with + 0.1 sec jitter)
5. On-demand (GICB register 0AH, transmitted on occurrence of a specific event)
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These squitters represent long replies of length 112 bits and are transmitted on downlink
format (DF) = 17. The 112 bits consist of the standard 56 bit squitter in the All-Call reply
format and is appended with an additional 56-bits to include the appropriate GICB register.
Change NO. 2A has defined protocols for selecting the squitter type to be transmitted, allows
for squitter rate control, and also allows selection of the antenna to be used for transmitting
the squitter. Squitter capability reports are used to inform ATC and other aircraft of an
aircraft's capability to participate in Extended Squitter. Mechanisms are also in place to
ensure the validity of Extended Squitter and GICB register data. Figure 7-1 illustrates the
formats defined for airborne (GICB register 05H, also referred to as BDS 05H) and airborne
supplementary (BDS 09H) squitters.
From Figure 7-1 it is evident that all of the core AILS state data except bank angle / roll is
included in these squitter formats. The airborne position squitter provides 12 bits of altitude
to 25 ft and 100 ft resolution, and provides latitude and longitude position to 5.1 meter
accuracy using 17 bits that are encoded using Compact Position Reporting (CPR) [ 10]. The
airborne supplementary squitter provides true track angle to 360/512 degree resolution and
ground speed to 4 knots of resolution (Note: AILS alerting was successfully evaluated for +/-
2 knot ground speed accuracy; the 4 knot resolution requires additional simulations to
determine if the provided resolution is sufficient for AILS alerting).
The airborne supplementary squitter has a sufficient number of spare bits to accommodate the
additional bank angle information needed by the AILS alerting function. As the AILS concept
matures, a request for incorporation of bank angle into the airborne supplementary may be
warranted.
7.2 Current GICB Interrogation Formats for Possible ACAS Crosslink Use
Figure 7-2 shows two GICB formats defined as air-air state information #1 and #2, known as
BDS 0BH and BDS 0CH, respectively. Again true track angle and ground speed are included
in these register definitions. In addition, bank angle / roll is also included. Currently these
GICB interrogations are intended for ATC requests for information but could easily be
included on the ACAS Crosslink. From the definitions of these registers, it appears that these
formats are in support of enroute operations where intent and next waypoint information is
useful for ATM.
7.3 Impact of Link Failure Rate
As discussed in section 5.3.5, AILS alerting can support 1 Hz state data updates and withstand
link failure rates of 10% to 20%. A closer look at link failure rate is warranted for an
AILS/Mode-S based communications link using Extended Squitter.
Table 7-1 summarizes results of an analysis performed by MIT Lincoln Labs [11] that
addresses the Extended Squitter reception probabilities by a TCAS or AILS receiver in the
presence of airborne and surface squitter and reply fruit (interference) for a range of aircraft
loadings and ADS-B equipage. Note that TCAS is the companion link for receiving Mode-S
Extended Squitters. This same receiver could be used for reception of AILS-based Extended
Squitters or replies to AILS ACAS Crosslink interrogations.
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ADS Squitter Reception (per second) with Airbome and Surface Fruit
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CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3
0.9792 0.9793 0.9793
0.9597 0.9630 0.9642
0.9144 0.9328 0.9396
0.8178 0.8758 0.9000
0.7108 0.8140 0.8621
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0.9972
0.9946
0.9868
0.9605
0.9155
0.8_'T/'
CASE 3
0.9972
0.9951
O.99O5
0.9800
0.9665
0.9504
PROBABILITY DtPP_'RENCE
CASE 1
1 ./_l"/e
3.36%
6.07%
8.12%
6.24%
2.07%
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1.79% 1.79%
3.16% 3.0g%
5.40% 5.09%
8.46% 8.00%
10.14% 10.44%
10.34% 12.47%
Table 7-1 Extended Squitter Reception Probabilities
Form "'GPS-Squitter Interference Analysis" - MIT Lincoln Laboratory [11 ]
Table 7-1 provides reception probabilities for 1 second updates when 2 squitters are
transmitted per second, thus two receive opportunities are available to achieve a 1 second
update rate. From Table 7-1 it is evident that reception probabilities for Extended Squitters
(referred to as GPS Squitter in the table) can be as low as 62 % for 100 aircraft located within
15 nmi of the TCAS/AILS receiver, 0% of which are equipped with ADS-B capability.
Reception probability improves to -95% when all aircraft are ADS-B equipped. While these
reflect successful reception rates given two attempts per second, the single attempt reception
probabilities fall as low as 39 % for 0% ADS-B equipage and improve to - 60% when 50% of
aircraft are ADS-B equipped. Table 7-2 summarizes single attempt reception probabilities.
The 100 aircraft loading represents an extremely high traffic density, i.e., 100 aircraft are
within 15 nmi of the TCAS/AILS aircraft receiver.
For 50 aircraft with 50 % ADS-B equipage the single attempt reception probability increases to
80 % resulting in an effective 1 second reception probability of 96 %. This reception probability
is sufficient for AILS alerting. For full 100 aircraft traffic densities, an increase in the rate of
AILS-based Extended Squitters exceeding the typical 2 / sec rate would ensure sufficient link
reception rates. Note: Only a few aircraft, those performing AILS approaches, would be
allowed to increase their squitter rate for the duration of the approach / landing flight phase.
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First Attempt Probabifity of Reception
Case 2 Case 3
0.96 0.96
0.94 0.94
0.89 0.91
0.80 0.86
0.71 0.82
0.61 0.77
Case 1
0.96
0.93
0.85
0.68
0.52
0.39
Case 1- 0% ADS-B equipage
Case 2 - 50% ADS-B equipage
Case 3 - 100% ADS-B equipage
Table 7-2 First Attempt Reception Probabilities of an Extended Squitter
7.4 Potential Need for Time Tagging of AILS Position Updates
Due to the close spacings and the high approach speeds it appears that time tagging of GPS
position updates may be required. At present, ADS-B position reports are envisioned as
follows: 1) The GPS sensor provides a position update at a 1 Hz rate; 2) the new position
report is written into the appropriate Mode-S GICB register (BDS 05H); 3) the Mode-S
transponder generates a squitter of this data at a 2 per second rate using a time jitter of +/- 0.1
sec. Due to the asynchronous nature of the GPS sensor position update and the actual
transmission of the ADS-B squitter, a time uncertainty of as much as 0.5 seconds is possible.
During this time, an aircraft traveling at 270 ft/sec during the runway approach phase
experiences an along track position error as large as 135 ft. While this has not been simulated,
it is expected that such a large along track position uncertainty would degrade AILS alerting
performance to the 500 ft protection volume.
Possible options to reduce this position uncertainty are: 1) several bits of GPS time tag
information are also squittered to allow the receiving aircraft to determine the time difference
between the GPS sensor update time and the actual time of squitter reception; 2) the
transmitting aircraft, just prior to transmitting the position squitter, updates the position report
to account for the time elapsed since the GPS sensor output; 3) an increase in squitter rate to
perhaps as high as 10 / sec to reduce the position uncertainty to 27 ft.
Option 1 requires that both aircraft are locked to GPS time and that several additional bits (3
or 4) of time tag data are set aside in the Extended Squitter. At present, these squitters are
fully defined and have no additional spare bits for time tagging.
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Option 2 requires additional processing by the Mode-S transponder not currently defined in
order to compute an updated position report at the time of squitter transmission. The update is
based on the elapsed time since the GPS sensor output was provided.
Option 3 would allow a reduction in position uncertainty and at the same time boost the
reception probability by allowing more opportunities to receive position reports. This could
easily be incorporated as an AILS Extended Squitter mode that can be controlled by ATC.
Additional loading on the Mode-S link can be mitigated by only allowing the relatively small
number of aircraft executing an AILS parallel approach operation to use the higher squitter
rates (likely under ATC rate control).
7.5 Other AILS Data Link Communications
Other probable AILS data to be data linked are:
1. Aircraft ID.
2. Runway ID indicating the runway used for approach and landing. This allows both
aircraft on an AILS approach to cross check each others landing intent to avoid
inadvertent landings on the same run.
3. Location of installed antennas (GPS, upper and lower Mode-S antennas).
Location data indicates X, Z position relative to nose of aircraft. This allows for
adjustment to position information; GPS antenna location may be used to refine ADS-B
position reports; Mode-S antenna location may be used to refine TCAS range and ground
multilateration surveillance range.
4. TSE (total system error) containment status of other aircraft; i.e., does other aircraft think
it is meeting it's allocated Required Navigation Performance (RNP) for the AILS
approach. Conversely, own aircraft monitors it's own TSE containment and sets it's TSE
containment status field. This information could be included in a "squitter" or could be
provided via request from the other aircraft.
5. DGPS related data.
DGPS corrections and approach waypoints.
Note: CPROPS will require a number of procedural communications between ATC and also
with the adjoining parallel traffic. Procedural exchanges between ATC and adjoining aircraft
can be accomplished via Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) or using the
ACAS Crosslink.
AILS CPDLC is tactical in nature and will require low-latency communications. Presently,
Mode-S is the only viable tactical link capable of fast updates. Whether Mode-S is the
appropriate tactical CPDLC link is to be determined and is outside the scope of this study. If
Mode-S is used for these tactical AILS-based CPDLC communications, the latency of a
rotating Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) sensor may be excessive (4.8 sec), and it may
become necessary to equip the ground with an omni or sectored, low-latency CPDLC Mode-S
ground station.
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Procedural communications may consist of the following notifications:
1) TSE containment warnings.
2) Go-around instructions or intent to perform a go-around.
3) Evasive maneuver instructions or intent to perform an evasive maneuver.
4) Cross check of proper runway ID.
5) Instructions from ATC to commence transmission of AILS Extended Squirters.
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8. Required Airspace Infrastructure for AILS
Since AILS is essentially a flight-deck centered system, only limited airspace infrastructure is
needed to support AILS. The major sub-systems of AILS are the Parallel Runway RNP sub-
system used for conformance monitoring of own aircraft during the approach and landing
flight phases, and the AILS Alerting sub-system which serves as a back-up system in the event
of a blunder by the intruder during independent parallel runway approaches.
Infrastructure requirements are primarily for augmentation support of the GPS/GNSS
navigation system, surveillance, and data link. In addition, the ground controller may require
a situational awareness display that emulates the AILS alerting function on the ground.
The GPS navigation system may be augmented by a Local Area Augmentation System
(LAAS) or a Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). Both augmentations will suffice for
AILS in terms of achievable accuracy. A typical LAAS system will require a ground
reference GPS/GNSS receiver, DGNSS data processing, a DGNSS signal integrity monitor
function, and a DGNSS uplink broadcast transmitter for sending correction data and
waypoints. The data link for DGNSS is still being debated in industry. A VHF Time
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) broadcast transmitter using navigation frequencies (108-
118 MHz is being considered as a likely candidate (RTCA DO-217, Appendix F).
If WAAS is used, the ground-based infrastructure will require development of a continental
system consisting of-24 reference stations, 2 control stations and 3 INMARSAT GEO
satellites. WAAS correction and integrity data is uplinked to the INMARSAT satellites,
which then broadcast this data via the WAAS GPS signal.
Even though AILS provides airborne alerting / separation assurance against parallel runway
approach blunders, a ground surveillance system will be required to allow ATC to provide
ATM and separation assurance. The ground surveillance system will likely utilize the current
SSR system and will begin to transition to more global implementation of ADS-B. Instead of
using rotating beam SSRs, use of omni and sectored ground stations is being considered in
support of ADS-B surveillance.
AILS may use a data link to ATC for procedural communications. These communications will
tend to be tactical in nature for the flight phases encompassed by AILS. At present Mode-S is
the only viable data link for "tactical" Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC).
In order to provide the ground controller with improved situational awareness, it may be
appropriate to provide an AILS monitor and display to emulate the airborne AILS alerting
system. However, the primary separation assurance system is expected to be in the AILS
avionics system in the aircraft.
AILS will need to coexist with the planned ADS-B Extended Squitter surveillance system and
will likely utilize the Mode-S channel (1030/1090 MHz). MIT Lincoln Laboratories has
analyzed the capacity and interference of a Mode-S based ADS-B system [ 11 ][ 12].
Conclusions suggest that Extended Squitter can be accommodated without appreciable
interference effects on current system operation on the Mode-S frequencies, while supporting
a high-density air traffic environment. AILS using Mode-S is not expected to adversely affect
Mode-S ADS-B environment.
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9. Assessment of Avionics for AILS
The following capabilities are required for an AILS system:
1. Avionics for "conformance monitoring" of own approach path, i.e., Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) to a predefined parallel runway approach path / tunnel.
2. ADS-B / surveillance data link.
3. AILS alerting avionics.
4. Aircraft Sensors.
5. Aircraft Displays.
9.1 AILS RNP Avionics
While the primary focus of this study has been on the development of alerting algorithms to
warn against approach blunders by the intruder aircraft, an important component of AILS is
conformance monitoring of "own" aircraft's performance and adherence to its approach path.
This "self" conformance monitoring is also termed Required Navigation Performance (RNP).
Figure 9-1 illustrates NASA' preliminary concept of AILS RNP for parallel runway
approaches. The AILS RNP "Rocket Ship" shown in Figure 9-1 defines a lateral approach
tunnel to which each aircraft is expected to adhere. In addition to the lateral "Rocket Ship"
tunnel, RNP attitude, consisting of own aircraft's track heading and bank angle, is monitored
to detect RNP containment and attitude violations by own aircraft. Note: RTCA SC-181 is
currently defining Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for a range of RNP
capabilities. NASA's "Rocket Ship" is an example of one such RNP tunnel concept.
In order for an aircraft to meet its parallel approach RNP, navigation and flight technical
errors must be monitored to a high-level of integrity. Future parallel runway approaches will
likely use a combination of ILS, MLS and GPS for navigation, also called the Multi-Mode
Receiver (MMR). A navigation processor will be needed to blend the appropriate mix of
navigation signals that may be available into a single guidance signal. This navigation
processor will also measure the Flight Technical Error (FTE) in order to determine if RNP
containment to the parallel runway approach tunnel or path is being met, i.e., it is the
navigation processor that detects Total System Error (TSE) containment violations.
Navigation processing could be implemented within the MMR.
A navigation database is likely required to allow comparison of the actual flight path to the
reference flight path in order to determine FTE and allow monitoring of RNP performance. The
database may be stored on the aircraft or could be provided via data link, e.g., DGPS uplink of
correction data and approach waypoints. An on-board database could reside within the MMR.
An augmented GPS/GNSS receiver will probably be required for AILS RNP and AILS
intruder alerting. For LAAS, an airborne data link receiver is required for receiving DGPS
correction data and also possibly for approach waypoints. The industry has not yet down
selected the type of data link needed for this application. A VHF broadcast TDMA radio as
defined in the Special CAT-1 Approach System MASPS, DO-217 Appendix F is a likely
candidate. If WAAS is used, the need for an additional data link for GPS corrections data is
eliminated; corrections are received via a WAAS capable GPS receiver. An augmented GPS
system is already expected to be required for ADS-B, thus AILS can take advantage of
existing equipment.
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9.2 ADS-B / Surveillance Data Link
The current definition of Extended Squitter (DO-181 A, Change NO. 2A, [ 10]) nearly provides
the needed surveillance capability for AILS. Bank angle information is still required and there
is the issue of time tagging position reports (section 7.4). AILS surveillance and alerting is
compatible with the planned ADS-B surveillance system.
Upgraded Mode-S and TCAS receiver-transmitter avionics are needed to provide the
surveillance capability for the AILS alerting sub-system.
While not a requirement, some AILS procedural communications between an aircraft and
ATC or air-to-air communications may be desirable. Such communications would likely
require a tactical data link. At present, the Mode-S link is the only available link capable of
tactical, low-latency communications. Other data links may be considered as the AILS
concept matures.
9.3 AILS Alerting Avionics
AILS is very similar to TCAS as an alerting system. In fact, AILS can be considered as a
specific mode of TCAS for providing separation assurance during parallel runway approach
operations. While Mode-S and TCAS receiver-transmitters upgraded to AILS capability
provide surveillance data, an AILS "TCAS" like processing system is needed. Ultimately,
AILS alerting would consist of additional software within TCAS that is enabled during
parallel runway approaches.
9.4 Avionics Sensors
An IRS is needed to provide bank angle / roll information for AILS alerting. The remaining
AILS core state data is provided by the augmented GPS system, i.e., latitudinal and
longitudinal position, true track angle/heading, and ground speed.
9.5 Displays
NASA has developed prototype display formats and symbology that provide the flight crew
with AILS situational awareness and some guidance cues. These will be provided via the
Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Navigation Display (ND). Display generators capable of
data loading allow for rapid prototyping of AILS display concepts.
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10. Existing and Evolving PRM Techniques
This section discusses existing and evolving techniques and systems that have the potential to
permit operations during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) on parallel runways
with a separation of less than 4,300 feet.
There is only one system and it is still under development that will permit independent aircraft
operations during IMC when the runway spacing is less than 4,300 feet. That system is the
Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) system being developed and tested by the FAA. The PRM
is based on a high update rate ( 1 to 2 updates per second) radar to determine aircraft position.
Several enhancements have also been proposed for this system. One enhancement is to
augment or replace the radar position information with GPS-based position broadcast from the
participating aircraft. Another enhancement would be to replace the radar derived position
information with position information derived from a multilateration system. Multilateration,
based on radio triangulation techniques, is one of the techniques being investigated to provide
position information for the Airport Surface Traffic Automation (ASTA) system.
The PRM and the enhanced PRM systems are discussed in the following sections. A high
level cost discussion follows the system descriptions.
10.1 FAA Precision Runway Monitor
The FAA Precision Runway Monitor system is described in [3]. The PRM demonstrations produced
a broad recognition that the system could be used at the 3,400 foot runway spacings.
Five limited production radar systems with the electronically-scanned antennas have been ordered
and/or delivered. The first one is being (or will soon will be) installed at Minneapolis (MSP). Other
airports under consideration are JFK, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Pittsburgh. St. Louis is also being
considered for a PRM installation and a cost benefits analysis is being conducted by the FAA.
The FAA Technical Center has determined that the PRM will not work when the runway spacing is
3,000 foot or less. The failure was caused by the nominal communication lags in contacting the pilot
after the controller determines there is a threat. The communication lag is too great even without
considering the blocked message problem.
Along with the PRM, the FAA is developing a Final Monitor Aid (FMA). The FMA provides a
display to assist controllers with the task of monitoring aircraft spacings during approaches to closely-
spaced parallel runways. The FMA can also be used with the augmented PRM systems discussed in
the following sections.
10.2 PRM Augmented with GPS
The FAA's Aviation System Capital Investment Plan - June 1995 [6] reports that the FAA plans to
investigate the combined use of PRM with GPS. The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) system has been proposed for position tracking of aircraft. In domestic terminal area
airspace, the airborne ADS-B system is capable of broadcasting current GPS position two times per
second. If ADS-B comes into widespread use by airlines, a ground-based receiver could receive
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aircraftpositionreportsandthePRMsystemcouldusethatinformationinplaceof theelectronically-
scannedradarderivedpositioninformation.
Theairlineswill probablynotbeabletocostjustify theinstallationof ADS-Bonlyfor PRM.
However,if ADS-B is installedfor otherpurposesit couldalsobeusedforPRM.
Theuseof moreaccuratenavigation/landingsystemsuchasGPSwill reducerandompathtracking
errorsandthusmakeit easierto determinerealblunders.ThismayallowPRMtobeusedfor runway
spacingsof lessthan3,000feet.Theimprovedblunderdetectioncapabilitymadepossiblebythe
reducedrandompathtrackingerrorswill benefitall thesystemsdiscussedhere,includingAILS so
thisbenefitisnotuniqueto thePRM.
10.3 PRM Augmented with Multilateration
The use of multilateration position determination could replace the electronically-scanned antenna
used by the current PRM implementation.
Multilateration is one of the techniques being investigated to provide position information for the
Airport Surface Traffic Automation (ASTA) surveillance system. Multilateration is based on a radio
triangulation technique. Multiple ground stations receive a radio signal from the aircraft and position
is determined by the difference in time of arrival of the signal at the different ground stations. The
radio signal used by the multilateration system is the signal from the existing Mode S transponders on
commercial aircraft. Thus, no extra equipment needs to be installed on the aircraft for the
multilateration system, whereas the GPS augmentation discussed in the previous section will require
that ADS-B or a similar system be installed on the aircraft.
Multilateration will only be practical for PRM if it is implemented for ASTA. Depending on airport
size and layout, the ASTA surveillance system will require 5-10 (or more) ground stations and a
central processor for multilateration. Multilateration for use with PRM will require that an additional
3-5 ground stations be added to the ASTA system. The additional ground stations would need to be
located outside the periphery of the airport boundaries in order to give a geometry suitable for
position determination during approach. Locations off the airport would have to be secure sites to
prevent tampering with the navigation aid.
10.4 PRM Cost Considerations
This section compares the relative cost of the systems discussed above. Except as noted the cost
information (in 1991 dollars) in this section is taken from RTCA/DO-211 report Appendix C [7].
The PRM-Multilateration system cost with ASTA-Multilateration already installed at the airport is
based on the assumption that 5 additional ground stations are required and that the cost of each station
is equivalent to one Ground Based ADS-B station ($200,000).
The ground based system costs are average installed costs but do not include buildings and land. It is
assumed that GPS/GNSS receivers are already installed on the aircraft. The system capital costs are
show in Table 10-1.
As stated in the PRM Report, there are ten major airports in the USA with runway spacings between
3,000 feet and 4,300 feet. These airports are:
10-2
Ft. Lauderdale
Salt Lake City
Detroit
Phoenix
Raleigh-Durham
Memphis
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Portland
JFK
Dallas Love
Table 10-2 shows the capital costs to implement the various systems at 10 airports.
Note: A multilateration analysis tool developed for another study was used to assess achievable
accuracies of a PRM system based on multilateration using aircraft transponder transmissions. These
results are described in Appendix D.
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11. Summary and Future Plans
This report has described the development of a prototype Airbome Information for
Lateral Spacing (AILS) system. AILS is envisioned as a flight-deck centered parallel
runway approach system to allow simultaneous, independent parallel approaches to
closely-spaced runways in low-visibility conditions. NASA Ames and NASA Langley
Research Centers are the sponsors of this program that falls under a larger program that
address Terminal Area Productivity (TAP).
While this report alludes to the overall AILS concept and describes the activities and
roles of the NASA AILS team, the primary purpose of this report is to document
Rockwell Collins Avionics' study of a prototype AILS alerting system.
A simulation program was developed to allow Monte Carlo evaluation of candidate AILS
alerting algorithms to determine the extent of runway spacings that may be supported.
Flight track templates/scenarios were flown on a Fokker 70 part-task simulator to
generate realistic aircraft state representations of normal, blunder, fake blunder, and
evasive maneuver tracks.
A number of factors influence the performance of the AILS alerting system; 1) cross-
track offset (i.e., Flight Technical Error, FTE), 2) longitudinal-track offset, 3) pilot and
aircraft response time, 4) type of evasive maneuver used, 5) effect of avionics sensor
uncertainty on state data, 6) data update rate, and 7) data link failure rate.
Based on simulations and using conservative probability distributions to represent pilot /
aircraft response time it appears that a 2,500 ft runway spacing is viable for proper
alerting performance in terms of probability of missed detection and probability of false
alarms when detecting for aircraft blunders. Pilot response time is the primary factor
affecting AILS alerting and the achievable runway spacing. With proper training and
appropriate situational awareness, pilot response times may be reduced considerably
below those referred to above. This may allow for a further reduction of runway spacings
perhaps as low as 1,700 ft.
To obtain an indication of pilot response time using the AILS alerting system described in
this report, NASA Langley is conducting flight simulator evaluation using subject pilots
to gather data on pilot response time and workload while performing an AILS-type
approach. PFD and ND displays provide situational awareness and guidance cues for
pilots in these experiments. These results will be folded back into the Monte Carlo
Simulation to further assess AILS alerting system performance.
In addition to developing a prototype AILS alerting system, this study also addressed
AILS avionics and infrastructure requirements. Being a flight-deck centered system,
AILS requires a minimum of infrastructure support. Infrastructure support consists
primarily of GPS/GNSS, ADS-B and CPDLC data link and perhaps a ground controller
AILS situational awareness display.
Avionics requirements are also relatively minimal since AILS can be viewed as a new,
additional mode of TCAS and can use existing and future versions of Mode-S and TCAS
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receiver-transmitteravionicsfor surveillanceandair-to-aircommunicationsusingACAS
Crosslink. AILS alertingis a softwaretaskthatcouldbe incorporatedwith TCAS. In
additionto surveillanceandalertingfunctions,AILS alsorequiresconformance
monitoringof own aircrafton its approachflight path. TheAILS RNPsub-system
providesthis capability. This taskdid not focuson thedevelopmentof anAILS RNP
sub-system.
ControllerPilot DataLink Communications(CPDLC)for AILS areprimarily tactical in
nature.Thefuturedatalink for AILS CPDLCproceduralcommunicationsis yet to be
determinedby industry,althoughMode-Siscurrentlytheonly viablelink that is
available.
Futureplansfor theNASA AILS teamareto continueto evolvetheAILS concept. In the
nearterm,NASA Langleyis conductingflight simulatorevaluationof the initial AILS
alertingsystemanddisplayconceptsusingsubjectpilotsto determinepilot responsetime
andworkload. This datawill be foldedbackinto MonteCarlosimulationsof AILS
alertingto reassessAILS alertingperformancefor a largenumberof aircraftblunders.
NASA Langley andNASA Ameswill continueto evolveAILS displayformatsand
symbologyto providetheflight crewwith situationalawarenessandguidanceduring
AILS approaches.
While theprimaryfocushasbeenon theAILS alertingsystem,theNASA AILS team
plansto put moreemphasison thedevelopmentof theAILS RNPsub-systemfor
conformancemonitoringof own aircraftduringtheapproachphase.NASA is planningto
performflight testsof bothAILS RNPandAILS alertingsub-systemconceptsin 1997.
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AILS Guidelines and Procedures
A-1
Table A-1
Guidelines for Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS)
(Draft #2 9/15/95)
This Appendix documents guidelines for the development of AILS. It represents
preliminary thoughts and guidelines developed by the NASA team. It is expected that
this document will be updated as warranted as the AILS concept continues to evolve.
I. Purpose & Scope:
A. This document presents the guidelines for the development of controls,
displays, alerts, warnings, and procedures for airborne systems that ensure
adequate aircraft separation during closely-spaced parallel runway operations,
i.e., Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS).
B. AILS shall consider: (1) airborne devices in the intruding aircraft that reduce
both the probability that it will deviate from its assigned airspace and the
magnitude of any such deviation;(2) airborne devices in the evading aircraft
that will prevent separations of less than 500 feet, and (3) ground devices that
may be needed by ATC to control closely-spaced parallel approach traffic
prior to the approach, during the approach, and after the initiation of the
evasion maneuver.
C. The AILS system development shall include recommended changes to ATC
and flight crew procedures and training.
II. Def'mitions:
A. ATC - The appropriate part of the Air Traffic Control system that is
responsible for separation of aircraft immediately before, during and
immediately after closely-spaced parallel runway operations.
B. Intruding Aircraft - an aircraft that has deviated from its assigned airspace and
may cause a potential collision with another aircraft.
C. Evading Aircraft - an aircraft that is within its assigned airspace but may have
to maneuver to avoid an intruding aircraft.
D. Caution - Visual and aural alert of a time sensitive situation.
E. Warning - Visual and aural alert of a time critical situation.
III. Human Factors Considerations:
A. Any additional pilot requirement(s) during the approach and landing phases of
flight shall be reasonable and necessary.
B. Any information that is added to the cockpit displays to satisfy an additional
pilot requirement shall be necessary and sufficient to satisfy the requirement.
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C. Becauseof thehighworkloadassociatedwith theapproachandlandingphases
of flight, AILS tasksanddisplaysshallnotdistractthepilot from hisprimary
dutiesof controllingtheflight path.
D. Any airbornedisplaythatshowsthepositionof theintruding andevading
aircraftshallaccuratelypresentall relevantandrequiredinformationabout
bothaircraft.
E. The AILS alertandavoidancemaneuvergenerationsystemshalluse the
standardFAA pilot reactiontimeof 2 seconds.
F. TheAILS alert andavoidancemaneuvergenerationsystemmustbereliable to
thepilots of bothaircraftby detectinganymaneuversthatjeopardize500foot
minimumseparationandgeneratingappropriatealertsfor eachaircraftwith a
minimumof falsealarms.
G. Theappropriaterolesof thepilot andof theAILS systemin deciding and
actinguponalertsandavoidancemaneuversshallbedetermined.
IV. Cautions and Warnings:
A. Neither cautions nor warnings shall be given to the crew of the intruding
aircraft as long as the aircraft is forecast to remain in its assigned airspace
(Definition of assigned airspace is TBD).
B. Warnings in the intruding aircraft shall be given when the aircraft has deviated
from its assigned airspace.
C. Neither cautions nor warnings shall be given to the crew of the evading
aircraft unless there is a threat to the evading aircraft.
D. Warnings in the evading aircraft shall be given when evasive action is
required to maintain at least 500 feet separation.
E° Alerts and warnings for the evading aircraft shall activate with sufficient lead
time to allow for safe execution (at least 500 feet separation) of the avoidance
maneuver.
F. Once a warning has been given to the evading aircraft, the approach shall be
considered abandoned.
G. If separation of less than 500 feet is possible during the evasion maneuver,
display information shall be provided to the pilot.
V. Operational Considerations:
A° In consideration of existing TCAS technology, AILS displays should be as
lose to TCAS displays as possible. AILS displays must be operationally
compatible with TCAS.
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B.
C.
D°
E.
F°
G.
n.
I°
J.
The AILS controls, displays, alerts, and warnings should consider the
appropriate SAE Aerospace Standards (AS), Aerospace Recommended
Practices (ARP), and Aerospace Information Reports (AIR). Any deviations
should be documented.
Evasive strategies should consider the various parameters needed to optimize
the separation distance such as: (1) optimum time to initiate the evading
maneuver, (2) optimum bank angle during the evading maneuver, (3) optimum
direction of turn, or flight path angle, (4) optimum duration of the maneuver,
(5) optimum vertical maneuver strength, and (6) terrain clearance.
Evasive strategies should consider dynamic conditions when both aircraft are
maneuvering as well as static conditions when only the evading aircraft is
maneuvering. (The intent of this paragraph is to consider the dynamic case
when the intruder begins an intrusion, causing the evader to start the evasion
maneuver, and then the intruder recognizes his error and reverses direction
back towards his runway).
To be operationally realistic, scenarios should include, but are not limited to,
typical operational human errors such as: (1) tuning the wrong ILS frequency
or missed approach navigation aid, (2) visual maneuvering to the wrong
runway, (3) incorrect or misunderstood clearances, (4) tracking errors resulting
from strong cross winds, (5) failure to recognize malfunctioning equipment,
(6) overshoots during localizer intercept, and (7) simultaneous go-arounds.
To be operationally representative, intruding scenarios should represent all
possible collision and near-miss trajectories, with different rates of lateral and
vertical convergence of the intruding aircraft, and with different relative
speeds between the aircraft.
The closely-spaced parallel approach system shall be validated in manual, and
automatic (Flight Director and Autopilot) control modes under various
crosswind and turbulence levels.
Special approach charts, cockpit procedures, and checklists shall be developed
for the pilot flying and for the pilot not-flying.
ATC procedures shall be developed for closely-spaced parallel approaches.
If necessary, operational constraints such as along-track stagger, airspeed,
weather, airborne equipment, runway geometry, ground equipment,
NAVAIDS, and ATC may be used in the development of an AILS system.
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Table A-2
Procedures and Assumptions for Initial Flight Simulation
Alerting Experiments
Operational Information and Assumptions:
1. Initial flight simulation will be based upon a Glass Cockpit flight deck environment.
2. Approaches will be flown into parallel runways 26L and 26R at Denver International
Airport, Colorado with a simulated spacing of 3400'.
Light to moderate turbulence will be implemented for all approaches.
All approaches will be flown manually.
Flight Director (FD) guidance will be available for the instrument approach but will
not provide maneuver guidance for the avoidance of an intruder.
6. The simulation will provide auto-throttle speed control.
7. Reference speed for final approach will be TBD knots indicated airspeed (KIAS).
8. ATC will not respond to any communications relating to converging traffic. Pilot
Flying (PF) must fly, decide and avoid based on AILS alerts.
9. Pilot Not Flying (PNF) will NOT provide any assistance during converging traffic
alerts, conflict resolution decision making or evasive maneuvering.
10. PF can ask the PNF for clarification of other general issues not involved in the actual
conflict resolution.
11. PF can and should request PNF to make necessary ATC contacts.
Closely Spaced Parallel Approach Simulation:
12. Approach plates will be provided indicating the Missed Approach (MA) procedure
necessary to accommodate the intended breakoff maneuver.
13. Scenarios will start with the aircraft on a heading (HDG) to intercept the Localizer
(LOC).
14. Expect to intercept the LOC at least 2 NM outside Final Approach Fix (FAF).
15. PF should call for appropriate items to configure Aircraft (A/C) for landing prior to
FAF.
16. PF should intercept and fly the Glide Slope (G/S).
.
4.
5.
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17. The actual encounter with intruding traffic will be dispersed along the final approach
path between the FAF and the Runway (RWY).
18. PF shall be expected to detect and maneuver appropriately away from the intruding
aircraft by utilizing up to a 30 ° bank and 2,000 Foot Per Minute (FPM) climb. The
turn shall be according to the evasive maneuver heading cue presented on the
navigation display compass rose, which is 45 degrees from runway heading away
from intruder.
19. When the PF determines that the conflict has been appropriately resolved, the aircraft
should be turned back to the RWY HDG and ATC should be contacted.
Alerting Information:
1. A Level 2 Caution Alert (yellow) indicates that traffic is converging.
2. For this evaluation, a Level 2 Caution alert will indicate that a level 3 Warning may
follow and is intended as a precursor to prepare the PF for an avoidance maneuver.
3. A Level 3 Warning Alert (Red) indicates that converging traffic has become a hazard
and an avoidance maneuver is required.
4. When a Level 3 Warning Alert is received the PF must break off the approach,
reconfigure for a missed approach, start a climbing turn away from the intruder.
Maneuvering Information:
. Successful maneuver requires an A/C reconfiguration for a missed approach Type
climb. Turn away from intruder using a 45 degree heading turn and using a 2,000
FPM climb.
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Appendix B Total System Error Analysis
This section provides results of an analysis of Total System Error (TSE) for runway
approaches using ILS and GPS navigation systems. Manual and autopilot approaches are
considered.
The Total System Error (TSE) is the total error between the desired flight path and the
actual flight path. TSE is comprised of navigation system and flight technical errors. The
Navigation System Error (NSE) is the difference between the true aircraft position and
the sensed or measured aircraft position. The Flight Technical Error (FTE) is the error
associated with controlling the aircraft flight path to null the deviation (or error signal) as
determined by the navigation system.
Assuming that the NSE and FTE errors are independent and normally distributed, the
standard deviation of the TSE is related to the NSE and FTE as:
TSE = (NSE 2 + FTE2) 0.5.
In order to estimate the total system error, the task is broken down in the subtasks of
estimating the NSE and VIE.
Navigation System Error (NSE)
The NSE for ILS- and GPS-based aircraft navigation systems was estimated based on the
error characteristics of each. The ILS system sources that contribute to the NSE include
the ILS beam alignment, the ILS beam bends, and the airborne ILS receiver. These errors
associated with a Type I, Type II, and Type III ILS beams for 9000' and 12,000' runways
have been estimated based on the minimum requirements of such systems as specified in
RTCA and ICAO documents (references are given below) The table in Attachment #2
summarizes the ILS localizer beam error specifications. The performance of fielded ILS
systems may be better than the specified minimum requirements.
The performance of non-augmented GPS has been "guaranteed" to be less than 100
meters (328 feet) horizontally [95%] by the DOD GPS Standard Positioning Service
(SPS). If GPS is augmented, e.g., with the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) or
a Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS), the associated navigation errors will be
greatly reduced. In order to support precision approach operations, the accuracy of such
systems is being specified by the FAA precision approach tunnel as well as in FAA
WAAS and LAAS documents.
References:
1. ICAO Annex 10, Aeronautical Telecommunications, Volume I (4 th Edition), April
1985.
2. RTCA/DO-117 -- Standard Adjustment Criteria for Airborne Localizer and Glide
Slope Receivers, March 14, 1963.
3. FAA Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) Request for Proposal, February 17,
1995.
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,5.
FAA Specification for the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) for Precision Approach and Landing with
GNSS Application, by R.J. Kelly, and J.M. Davis, Journal of the Institute of
Navigation, Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring 1994.
Flight Technical Error (FTE)
Flight Technical Error (FFE) includes the errors associated with controlling the aircraft to
the desired location as determined by the navigation system. This error may include the
autopilot or the pilot (and the displays) as well as all the other sensor information used in
the aircraft control algorithms. At this point, we have not conducted extensive research
into the true size of the FTE error. However, as a preliminary estimate, if the pilot is
manually flying the aircraft, it is believed that he can easily keep the aircraft within 0.5 to
1.0 dot [95%] on the Course Deviation Indicator (CDI) after he has stabilized the aircraft
on the approach flight path.
As a preliminary estimate, it is believed that an autopilot can maintain the aircraft to
within 100 feet [95%] of the desired position over the range of 5 to 15 nautical miles
from the airport. As the autopilot gets closer to the runway, the gains in the control loops
are typically increased to maintain tighter tracking to the desired flight path. However,
father out, the gains are more relaxed to allow for less control motion input. Once again,
this is just a rough estimate since the FTE is a function of the conditions (e.g., wind
gusts), aircraft responsiveness, autopilot control algorithms, and the avionics sensor suite
used to provide inputs to the autopilot.
Quantitative Analysis
A preliminary quantitative analysis was conducted to estimate the TSE at 5, 10, and 15
nautical miles from the runway threshold. The tabulation of this analysis appears in
Attachment #1. ILS and GPS navigation landing aids are considered. For both
navigation systems, the use of a conventional CDI display is assumed for manual
approaches. This attachment provides an estimate of the horizontal errors based on the
minimum system requirements associated with conducting an ILS approach to both 9000'
and 12,000' runways using Type I, Type II, and Type III ILS beams (refer to Tables 1 and
2). The worst case ILS navigation system errors are on the shorter runway with the Type
I (poorest quality) ILS beam. The worst case FTE errors for the manually flown aircraft
also appear on the shorter runway because of the reduced sensitivity of the CDI on the
shorter runway. Manually flown parallel runway approaches may wish to have the
capability to increase the sensitivity of the flight director display (e.g., CDI) to reduce
P-TE.
The horizontal system error specifications for the GPS-based approach system are also
given in Attachment #1. The navigation system errors associated with GPS/augmented
GPS are not a function of the runway length (as they are with ILS) and are essentially
independent of the range from the airport within the region of interest (0 to 15 nmi).
While the augmented GPS NSE is much less than that of ILS, FTE remains the same. For
manually flown approaches, a more sensitive deviation display could reduce FTE. This
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mayalsobedesirablefor parallelrunwayapproachesevenwhenflown with anautopilot
to moreaccuratelymonitortheapproach.Referto Tables3 and4 in Attachment#1 for
thespecificnumbers.Attachment# 2providesatableof ILS localizerbeamalignment
andbenderrors. Adjoining figuresattheendof theAppendixgraphicallydepictTSE,
NSE andFTE for thevariouscombinationsof approaches(ILS, GPS,manual,and
autopilot).
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Appendix C
Flight Track Templates used for AILS Alerting
Simulations
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Appendix C documents the flight track templates that used were used in the AILS Monte
Carlo simulations presented in this report. Flight track templates were produced via pilot
flown runway approaches using Collins AT&E's Fokker 70 part-task simulator. Normal,
blunder and fake blunder approaches were flown. The following describe the
approach/landing flight track generation methodology and associated constraints:
- A side-stick controller was utilized as the airplane control device.
- Autothrottle was turned on.
- Rudder pedals were unavailable.
Pilot flew to course deviation dots on PFD, i.e., no flight director guidance was used.
The ILS signal did not include effects of beam alignment and beam bend errors.
All flight tracks were flown in fog, i.e., at least Cat I conditions.
Flight tracks were flown in moderate wind gusts (12.5 knots) using JAR All Weather
Operations (AWO) model; (x, y, z wind gusts); no steady state cross wind
components were included.
8 flight track scenarios were flown.
Each scenario was flown at 3 speeds (130, 145 and 160 knots).
State variables recorded for each scenario are x, y, z position, bank angle/roll, pitch
angle, heading/yaw, and ground speed.
The following Flight Track Template Scenarios were flown:
1. Normal approach/landing - "FNRM"
2. 300 heading blunder - "FB30"
3. 150 heading blunder - "FB 15"
4. Constant 50 bank angle blunder - "FSB5"
5. Slow 10 ° heading change blunder - "FSLO"
6. Slow 5 o heading change blunder - "FSH5"
7. Fake blunder toward evader runway - "FFAK"
8. Intruder drifts away from own and evader's runway, recognizes error and
subsequently over adjusts causing a fake blunder - "FADJ"
Note - All scenarios commenced with a standard 30 degree intercept of localizer.
The following figures document the above flight track scenarios.
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Figure C-1A Normal Approach "FNRM"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure ColB Normal Approach "FNRM"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-2A Normal Approach "FNRM"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-2B Normal Approach "FNRM"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-3A Normal Approach "FNRM"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-3B Normal Approach "FNRM"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-4A 30 Degree Heading Blunder "FB30"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-4B 30 Degree Heading Blunder "FB30"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-5A 30 Degree Heading Blunder "FB30"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-5B 30 Degree Heading Blunder "FB30"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-6A 30 Degree Heading Blunder "FB30"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-6B 30 Degree Heading Blunder "FB30"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-7A 15 Degree Heading Blunder "FB15"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-8B 15 Degree Heading Blunder "FB15"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-8A 15 Degree Heading Blunder "FB15"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-8B 15 Degree Heading Blunder "FB15"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-9A 15 Degree Heading Blunder "FB15"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-9B 15 Degree Heading Blunder "FB15"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-10A Constant 5 Degree Bank Angle Blunder "FSB5"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-10B Constant 5 Degree Bank Angle Blunder "FSB5"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-11A Constant 5 Degree Bank Angle Blunder "FSB5"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-11B Constant 5 Degree Bank Angle Blunder "FSB5"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-12A Constant 5 Degree Bank Angle Blunder "FSB5"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-12B Constant 5 Degree Bank Angle Blunder "FSB5"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-13A Slow 10 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSLO"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-13B Slow 10 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSLO"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-14A Slow 10 Degree Heading Change Blunder- "FSLO"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-14B Slow 10 Degree Heading Change Blunder- "FSLO"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-15A Slow 10 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSLO"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-15B Slow 10 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSLO"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-16A Slow 5 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSH5"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-16B Slow 5 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSH5"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-17A Slow 5 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSH5"
(145 knot G round Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-17B Slow 5 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSH5"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-18A Slow 5 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSH5"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-18B Slow 5 Degree Heading Change Blunder "FSH5"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-19A Fake Blunder Toward Evader Runway "FFAK"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-19B Fake Blunder Toward Evader Runway "FFAK"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-20A Fake Blunder Toward Evader Runway "FFAK"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-20B Fake Blunder Toward Evader Runway "FFAK"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-21A Fake Blunder Toward Evader Runway "FFAK"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-21B Fake Blunder Toward Evader Runway "FFAK"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-22A Drift Away then Overadjust Blunder "FADJ"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-22B Drift Away then Overadjust Blunder "FADJ"
(130 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-23A Drift Away then Overadjust Blunder "FADJ"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-23B Drift Away then Overadjust Blunder "FADJ"
(145 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-24A Drift Away then Overadjust Blunder "FAD J"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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Figure C-24B Drift Away then Overadjust Blunder "FAD J"
(160 knot Ground Speed, 12.5 knot Wind Gusts, Fog)
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